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Chronological table of Augustine's life and educational writings 
354 Augustine born at Thagaste 
371 Goes to Carthage for the first time 
372 Takes a concubine and Patricius dies 
373 Reads Hortensius, birth of Adeodatus 
Consecation of Ambrose 
383 Sails for Rome 
384 Appointed professor of rhetoric in Milan 
385 Monica arrives in Milan 
386 Conversion at the end of August, goes to 
Cassiciacum (September) writes Contra 
Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine or 
Divine Providence and The Problem of Evil 
(December), Sotiquia (winter). 
387 Baptism on Easter, writes De immortalitate 
anima 
Death of Monica 
389 Death of Adeodatus 
396 De Doctrina Christiana 
397 Confessiones 
399 De natura boni contra Manichaeum, De 
Trinitate 
405 Contra Creconium grammaticum 
410 Alaric enters Rome, Roman refugees to Africa 
413 De civitate Dei, I-III (written before the death 
Marcellinus) 
De civitate Dei, IV-V 
415 De civitate Dei, VI-X 
417 De civitate Dei, XI-XIII 
420 De civitate Dei, XVII 
425 De civitate Dei, XVIII 
De civitate Dei, XIX-XXII 
430 Death and burial of Augustine, the ravaging of 
Numidia by Vandals.' 
Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 
cf. pp. 16, 74, 184, 282, and 378. Brown gives a detailed chronology of the major 
historical events during Augustine's lifetime and also lists all his major works. 
Outline for a Master of Sacred Theology Paper 
Thesis statement It is the purpose of this paper to examine Augustine's 
use or discarding of the classical methodology of education as found in 
his works de Ordine and de Doctrines Christiana. 
Introduction: The tension in the early church between the Christian faith 
and pagan culture found a compromise in Augustine's declaration: "Every 
good and true Christian should understand that wherever he may find 
truth, it is the Lord's". This he declared in de Doctrines Christiana, 396. 
L Historical Background 
A. The ancient Homeric paideia 
B. The conflict between the philosophical and the rhetorical 
truth claims within the classical methodology of education 
1. Plato and the philosophical tradition 
2. Isocrates and the rhetorical tradition 
a. The influence of Cicero's Hortensius 
b. Augustine's compromise: the rhetor in the service 
of truth 
C. The classical weltanschauung before Augustine 
D. A summary of the classical methodology of education 
II. De Ordine: Augustine's use or discarding of the classical 
educational methodology in his de Ordine or Divine Providence and the 
Problem of Evil: 
2 Augustine. On Christian Doctrine. Translated with introduction by D. W. Robertson, 
Jr. ( New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 54. 
vii 
A. Augustine's use of classical educational goals leads the 
wise, godly person to live a happy life (beata vita) in the 
cruel Roman world. 
1. To know God 
2. To know one's soul 
3. To live the happy life, beats vita 
B. Augustine uses the classical methodology of education to 
find the answer to the question: can one perceive and grasp 
an order of reality (ordinem rerum) by which the entire 
universe is held together and governed (coercetur ac 
regitur)? 
1. "Order is an arrangement of similar and dissimilar 
things, assigning its proper place to each one."' 
2. "Order is that by which God governs all things that 
are.
314 
3. "But with God, order always was"5 
4.. "Order is that which will lead us to God, if we hold to 
it during life; unless we do hold to it during life, we shall 
not come to God."' 
3 Augustine, de Ordine. annotations by Robert Russell. ( New York: Cosmopolitan 
Science & Art Service Co., Inc., 1942), p. 183. 
4 Ibid., Bk. II, cap. N, par. XI, pp. 92-93. Ordo est quo Deus agit omnia quae suns, si 
etiam stulus quae agit, agit ordine. 
5 Ibid., Bk. II, cap. VII, par. XXIII, pp. 114-115. Sed semper erat ordo apud Deum. 
6 Ibid., Bk. I, cap. IX, par. XXVII pp. 50-53. Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in vita, 
perducet ad Deum, et quem nisi tenuerimus in vita, non perveniemus ad 
Deum. 
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C. Related questions 
1. Are there events that occur by chance and 
outside order? 
2. Does God will evil? 
3. The role of the senses 
a. The eyes sense movement and color 
b. The ears sense sound 
4.. Augustine's personal journey of faith sought wholeness 
in the One God. 
a. His soul, cleansed by virtue, seeks oneness or 
unity. 
b. His mind uses memory as its slave. 
c. His reason, capable of philosophical reflection, 
makes sense out of cruel changes. 
5. The soul (anima) seeks to return to the one (unum) 
immovable God. 
a. God is the highest reason and the over-soul 
of the world to which the soul of people returns. 
b. God is just because He gives each one his due. 
c. The One, immovable God came among us in 
the Incarnation of His Son. 
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6. Augustine's use or discarding of the classical use of 
poetry, philosophy and rhetoric (the liberal arts) in the 
wise man's pursuit of the happy life, beats vita. 
a. Augustine's criticism of poetically inclined 
Licentius. 
b. Augustine's criticism of the vanity of rhetoric. 
c. Philosophy, the dialogical end of liberal arts. 
7. The place of Augustine's mother, Monica, and authority 
are in keeping with the classical methodology. 
8. What then is evil? 
a. The teacher who teaches grammar before the 
alphabet. 
b. The poet who uses solecisms and barbarisms. 
9. The wise man's enjoyment of God, who orders all things, 
overcomes all evil and is the answer to moires, fate. 
III. De Doctrina Christiana The use and discarding of the classical 
methodolgy of education in de Doctrina Christiana to train the 
aspiring Scriptural exegete and ecclesiastical orator in the proper 
rules of Scriptural interpretation and in teaching its truths 
A. A proper understanding of Scripture leads to the same 
goal that philosophy leads to--to enjoy the Highest Good, the 
One God, the Trinity. 
B. Scripture, when understood properly, leads to enjoyment 
and love of God and love of others, including love of one's 
enemies. 
x 
1. As the classical study of philosophy took one away 
from the things of this life, a study of Scripture 
exposes one's love of temporal things and self. 
2. Faith will stagger if the authority of Scriptures staggers. 
If faith staggers, charity will stagger. 
3. In keeping with the philosopher's desire to know deep 
things, the more difficult the meaning of the passage, 
the greater the exegete will appreciate its meaning. 
4. A sign is a thing that causes us to think of something 
beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the 
senses. 
a. The Scriptural understanding of numbers frees 
the exegete from fateful notions. 
b. An understanding of music is useful for 
understanding Scripture. 
C. In keeping with the philosopher's desire to know Truth, 
the ecclesiastical exegete and orator should understand that 
wherever he may find Truth (scientific truth) it is his Lord's. 
1. The practice of astrology is rooted in anti-Scriptural, 
anti-Truth, fate-filled notions. 
2. The Truth of an institution or custom depends 
upon common agreement, which may differ from 
Scriptural Truth. 
xi 
3. As the classical methodology taught logic as a method 
of discovering Truth, logical Truth can be found in the 
Bible, I Corinthians 15. 
4. A knowledge of Scriptural languages aids in discovering 
its truths. 
D. If rhetoric in the classical sense can be used in either urging 
evil or justice, why should it not be used in the service of 
Truth? 
1. Rhetoric should not be taught per se but should be 
caught by reading and hearing eloquence. 
2. The ecclesiastical orator is unaware of his eloquence 
but knows the wisdom of Scripture. 
3. The rhetoric used in Scripture doesn't abandon 
rhetoric's principles. 
a. Romans 5:3-5 
b. Amos 6:1-6 
4. Augustine finds Cicero's three pronged use of rhetoric 
(to teach is a necessity, to please is sweetness, to 
persuade is wisdom) useful for teaching Scriptural 
truths. 
5. Cicero urged that oratory should vary according to 
the subject: small things in a subdued manner, 
moderate things in a temperate manner, and grand 
things in a grand manner. 
a. Although the ecclesiastical orator has a grand 
subject, he speaks it best in a subdued manner. 
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b. Scripture makes use of all three styles. (Matthew 
25, Romans 12:6-16, Romans 8:28-39) 
c. Church fathers Cyprian and Ambrose, and even 
Augustine, used these styles of oratory. 
6. The ecclesiastical person should aspire to pursue those 
truths that are useful. 
IV. A summary and some implications for the Lutheran 
churchman 
Introduction 
The Christian Faith and Culture 
The tension between the Christian faith and culture in which the 
Christian finds himself has been part of the Christian experience ever 
since the disciples of the Pharisees came to Jesus and asked, "Tell us then, 
what is your opinion? Is it right to pay taxes to Caesar or not" (Mt. 
17:22)? Jesus' famous answer demonstrates that the Christian always 
lives in two worlds. "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is 
God's" (Mt. 17:21). 
A survey of the Biblical record will show that the degree to which 
the Christian participates in or uses the pagan world may vary. It will 
range from quoting a secular poet, as St. Paul does when he quotes the 
Cretan poet Epimenides (600 B. C.) in his Cretica to the philosophers on 
Mars Hill, "For in him we live, move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28)7, 
to the sharp separation from the world that can be found in this passage 
from the first letter of St. John, "Do not love the world or anything in 
' Robert G.Hoerber, ed. Concordia Self-Study Bible, New International Version. (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1986), p. 1690. (Other commentaries suggest that 
this quote comes from Aratus' (315-240 B. C.) Phaenomena or from Cleanthes (331-233 
B.C.) in his Hymn to Zeus. Some attribute the whole passage and the one following in 
Acts 17 to Epimenides' epic on Minos and Rhadamanthus. Some doubt whether "in him 
we live . . ." is a quotation. And some note that the same thought is found in Psalm 139. 
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the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him" 
(I john 2:15). 
The writings of the early church fathers reflect the same tension. 
The degree to which the early church fathers made use of or participated 
in the pagan world ranged from Tertullian (145 - 220), who, in his tract 
de Idololatria ( 221 - 222), denies Christians the right to teach (not to 
learn) secular subjects (because the teaching of secular subjects is 
absolutely incompatible with the Christian faith and on the level with the 
making of idols or of participating in astrology) to Augustine who advises 
the aspiring churchman that all truth (whether sacred or secular) is the 
Lord's.' In The Confessions, written at the time of the writing of de 
Doctrina Christiana, Augustine declares, "He [God] is everywhere where 
there is the least trace of truth."' Balanced against these words are 
Tertullian's stern words: 
Moreover, we must inquire likewise touching 
schoolmasters; not only of them, but also all other 
professors of literature. Nay, on the contrary, we must 
not doubt that they are in affinity with manifold 
8 Augustine, de Doctrina Christiana. Trans. with an intro. by D.W.Robertson, Jr. (New 
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), Bk. II, cap. XVIII, p. 54. 
9 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine. Trans. by Rex Warner with intro. by 
Vernon J. Bourke. (New York: New American Library, 1963), Bk. IV, cap. 12, p. 81. 
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idolatry. . . . How do we repudiate secular studies, 
without which divine studies cannot be pursued? . . . 
Learning literature is allowable for believers, rather 
than teaching; for the principles of learning and of 
teaching are different. If a believer teach literature, 
while he is teaching doubtless he commends, while he 
delivers he affirms, while he recalls he bears testimony 
to, the praises of idols interspersed therein. . . . Hence 
the devil gets men's early faith built up from the 
beginnings of their erudition.' 
Emperor Julian, the Apostate (360-363), who was a thorough-going 
Hellenist and who attempted to reverse the Christian trends of 
Constantine and his sons by closing down as many Christian institutions 
as possible, forbad Christians on June 17, 360, from teaching in pagan 
schools. He felt that when they taught the stories of the Greek and 
Roman gods they made a mockery out of what should have been taught 
in reverence. _Julian, along with many pagan Roman emperors before 
him, was convinced that the worship of the Greek and Roman gods was 
what made the Roman Empire great. For Julian the worship of the pagan 
gods was at the heart of Rome's glory. 
The actual wording of julian's edict said that permission to teach 
had to be obtained in advance from the municipal authorities and the 
'° Tertullian, de Idololatria. in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds. Ante-
Nicene Fathers, vol. III. Trans. by the Rev. S. Thelwall. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Co. 1986), cap. X, pp. 66-67 (Hereafter referrred to as ANF). 
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Emperor himself. This served as a guarantee for the teacher's efficiency 
and morality. "Christians who taught Homer and Hesiod without 
believing in the gods they described were accused of failing in honesty and 
candor by teaching something they did not believe. They were ordered 
either to apostatize or to give up teaching.Jill 
By inference we can assume that the early church fathers who were 
contemporaries of Julian must have not agreed with Tertullian's earlier 
mandate. Julian's edict inferred that Christians under his reign taught 
pagan subjects. And the history of the early church demonstrated that 
Tertullian's view was extreme and difficult to follow. For the greater part., 
the church borrowed from the pagan culture much like the Israelites did 
when they took the gold from Egypt before they exited from slavery in 
that land." 
But what actually was taught to the youthful Christians like _John 
Chrysostom or Aurelius Augustine in the pagan schools of Antioch or 
Thagaste or Carthage? What world view or weltanschauung was 
promoted? How much could be used and how much needed to be 
11 H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity. trans. by
.
george Lamb. (New 
York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 430-431. 
12 Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. II, cap. XL, p. 76. 
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discarded in the teaching of the faith? How sharp or how blurred did 
Augustine make the separation between the person of faith and the 
culture in which that person was found? 
These are some of the questions we will raise during this paper. In 
order to get at the answer to these questions, we will trace the classical 
methodology of education and its curriculum as it expresses the 
expectations the Roman culture had for its young. How many of these 
expectations would Augustine use in the education of his future 
Christians? After we delineate the classical methodology of 
education up until and during Augustine's day, we will seek to discover 
the influence of Roman culture's classical methodology of education in 
Augustine's de Ordine and de Doctrina Christiana. How much of the 
classical Roman educational methodology should the Christian use and 
how much should he discard? 
As we have already noted, Augustine is not the first early church 
father to deal with this tension, but he comes as Eugene Kevane (quoting 
Karl jasper) states, at the "Axial Period"" where we find Augustine 
13 Eugene Kevane, Augustine the Educator. (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman 
Press, 1964), p. 14. (Kevane quotes Karl Jaspers' The Origin and Goal of History. 
[London: Routledge, 1953] p. 26.) 
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projecting an "altogether different linear view of history which had been 
confined to the chosen people in Palestine during most of the classical 
centuries."' We find the prefiguring of this break with ancient classical 
thought in the lives and teachings of the early church fathers but it is 
given most elaborate expression in Augustine. 
The use or discarding the classical method of education can be 
already seen in the early church fathers prior to Augustine. Would 
Origen (185 - 253) have been effective as a catechist in the city of 
Alexandria had he not started a grammar school and been a teacher of 
grammar first? Would he later conclude that the work of a catechist was 
incompatible with the teaching of grammar?' Would the influential 
church father John of Antioch and Constantinople (347 - 407), a 
contemporary of Augustine, be known today as the Golden Mouth 
(Chrysostom) had he not had the pagan training in rhetoric in the school 
of one of Rome's most famous rhetors, the teacher Libanius?16 Would 
14 Ibid., p. 22. 
15 Ibid. 
16 
 Cf. Philip Schaff, "The Life and Work of St. John Chrysostom" in The Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, vol IX. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmanns Publishing 
Co. 1996), p. 6, (Hereafter referred to as "N PN F). 
19 
Jerome (345 - 420), another contemporary of Augustine, have had an 
interest in languages, and, therefore, become skilled enough to translate 
the Bible into Latin (The Vulgate) if he had not studied rhetoric (the 
most sought after discipline at the time) under Aelius Donatus in 
Rome?' Origen's passion for meaning, Chrysostom's passion for 
oratory, and Jerome's passion for translating evoke the question, which 
liberal arts tools are needed to promote the faith? The tension between 
the use or discarding of the classical method of education can be seen in 
the classical shadow that haunted _Jerome for most of his life. It was 
probably guilt over such fondness for the learning of secular subjects that 
drove Jerome, in the midst of a fever-ridden illness and in the midst of an 
ascetically enforced Lenten season of 374, to experience the famous anti-
Ciceronian vision. Thereafter, he resolved to stop studying the pagan 
writers and devoted himself to sacred studies' And finally, even though 
Augustine resigned from his position as a teacher of rhetoric in Milan 
after his conversion in 386, how much of the classical methodology of 
education would he retain? This paper will show Augustine's use of 
17 Philip Schaff, "Prolegomena to Jerome," NPN F., Second Series, vol. VI. (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Erdmanns Publishing Co. 1989), p. xvi. 
18 Ibid., p. xvii. 
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or the discarding of the classical methodology of education in the 
training of the churchman of his day. The main focus of inquiry will 
be on his two works de Ordine, written after his conversion in 386 and 
before his baptism on Easter 387 at the retreat at Cassiciacum, and de 
Doctrina Christiana, written ten years after his conversion. 
Jerome, who, in spite of his resolve to refrain from reading and 
using the pagan writers, later encouraged Magnus, an orator of Rome, to 
make use of them.' Chrysostom, who demonstrated his rejection of the 
pagan Roman culture by purposefully not mentioning in his sermons and 
writings his pagan teacher, Libanius, yet used the arguments of Plato to 
prove that the soul of a faithful servant of God is immortal.' Sensing 
this tension in the early Church, we can see why the rhetorically and 
Platonically-influenced statement of Augustine's that "every good and 
true Christian should understand that wherever he may find truth, it is 
19 Ibid., pp. 149 ff. In this letter that is dated A.D. 397, Jerome cites Moses, who 
relied upon his Egyptian training; the Book of Proverbs, which commences with dark 
sayings that belong by right to the sphere of the dialectician and philosopher; David, who 
uses the sword of Goliath to kill him; Hosea, who took a whore, Gomer, to be his wife; 
Jewish historian Josephus, who quotes many secular writers; early church father Origen, 
who quotes Plato and Aristotle, Numenius and Cornutus; and Cyprian, who wrote with 
splendid rhetoric that idols are no gods. 
zo Chrysostom, "To Prove That No One Can Hann The Man Who Does Not Injure Himself' 
in Philip Schaff, ed. N P N F. vol. IX. p. 269 ff. Chrysostom's treatise borrows the 
argument that Plato used in his tenth book of The Republic for the immortality of the soul. 
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the Lord's"' was a compromise to the tension that had been in the 
Christian church since its conception. 
The Homeric Paideia 
Kevane stated that "every human culture possesses a distinctive 
system and process of education, else it could not live in history for 
inability to transmit its essential values to its younger generation."" 
What were those essential values in the Greek culture? What was the 
proper way of transmitting them? The method of educating was the 
paideia or humanitas, "the distinctive classical education which 
corresponded to the initiation schools and was the accepted 
instrumentality in classical antiquity to teach a boy to become a man."' 
Classical education began with Homer. The texts of Homer were 
the basic texts. They were poetic. They glamorized the mythical heros 
and heroines, gods and goddesses. The poetry's aim was not essentially 
aesthetic but the immortalization of the hero. The poet, as Plato was to 
say, "clothes all the great deeds accomplished by the men of old with 
21 Augustine, Of Christian Doctrine. Bk. II, cap. XVIII, p. 54. 
22 Kevane, p. 8. 
23 Ibid. 
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glory, and thus educated those who come after."' What we have in the 
Homeric paideia was not history per se; it was not research into truths, 
ethical or metaphysical; it was not totally secular, either; but it was the 
promotion of ancient legends which carried with them values that all the 
young, through the recitation of Homeric poetry, were taught to imitate 
and to model. Here the Greek boys learned what it meant to be free, as 
much as one could be free in the fate-filled Greek world, what it meant 
to live a morally responsible life, and what it meant to be a complete 
Greek man. A major shift in Greek thought came with the dawn of the 
philosophical age as expressed in the questioning method of Socrates, the 
dialogues of Plato and the writings of Aristotle. The Greek world, and 
subsequent Roman world, would not be quite the same after these three 
had made their appearance on history's stage. Yet, through the 
subsequent more philosophical centuries, the stories of the escapades 
and heroic adventures of the gods and goddesses, mortal heroes and 
heroines, lingered on in the schools and the training of the young. A fully 
educated young man should know about these things. 
24 ibid. 
23 
The Philosophical and the Rhetorical Classical Traditions 
A safe assumption that one can make when doing research in the 
classical methodogy of education is that little changed over more than 
eight centuries of Roman history. The same curriculum is followed 
through the centuries with the end being the Socratic dialogical method 
of finding Truth as its highest level of learning. The researcher only has 
to examine Augustine's treatise The Teacher (begun during his days at 
the Cassiciacum Otium in A. D. 386 - 387 and finished after he moved to 
Thagaste, North Africa) to see the relationship between it and Plato's The 
Republic completed in 375 B.C. Both works are written around the 
Socratic mode of questioning: The Republic between Socrates and his 
companions; The Teacher between Augustine and his brilliant illegitimate 
son, Adeodatus. Both works celebrate the pursuit of Truth through the 
exchange of words in a conversation. Both are attempts to move the 
reader to think that reality (res) is beyond what one sees (signum). 
Both are convinced that man's rational soul is the connection to Truth. 
In Plato's analogy of the cave25 the cave's denizens see only shadows of 
25 Plato, The Republic. Trans. with notes and interpretative essay by Allan Bloom. (New 
York: Basic Books Inc., 1968), BK. VII, 514 - 517b, p. 193 if. 
24 
reality until one of them is forced out of the cave into the light of 
Truth.' In The Teacher Augustine guides his son out of the signs of this 
world into the Light of Christ's truth. Both Plato and Augustine are 
moving from the lower to the higher, from that which is seen to that 
which is not seen. The difference is that in The Teacher Augustine will 
not allow himself to be called the teacher of Truth. "We should not call 
any man on earth a teacher." Augustine quotes Matthew 23:9, "There 
is One in heaven who is the Teacher of all."' 
. .. What is meant by "in heaven" is something that will 
be taught by us by Him who directs us even through 
human agencies and external signs to turn inwardly to 
Him for our instruction. To love Him and to know Him, 
that is the happy life, which all proclaim they are 
seeking, but few there are who can rejoice at having 
really found it. . . . So you [Adeodatus] can see from 
whom it was that you learned these things. It was not 
from me [Augustine]. But if you did not know that 
what I said was true, then neither He nor I have taught 
you.28 
In The Republic Plato insists that Truth is something discovered 
26 
 Ibid. 
27 Augustine, The Teacher, cap. XIV in The Fathers of the Church, vol 59, trans. 
Robert P. Russell. (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1967), 
p. 60. 
a Ibid. 
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through the exercise of the mind and dialogue. In The Teacher Truth 
is something taught by Jesus. But in both the method that Plato had so 
successfully borrowed from Socrates is used. 
Down through the centuries of Roman history if changes come in 
the classical educational methodology, they come slowly. The major 
thinkers over the twelve or more centuries that the classical period 
extends are easy to name: Plato, Isocrates, Cicero, Augustine. These are 
key in understanding the major themes that carry the classical 
methodology of education forward until the "Axial Period" of 
Augustine." 
Plato and the Philosophical Tradition 
In Book X of Plato's The Republic he banished the poets (poetry 
at the very essence of the Homeric paideia) as a serious detriment for 
the Socratic pursuit of the Truth in his Ideal City.' He accused them of 
glorifying an imitation of the Greek heroes and heroines. They aroused 
the passions and do not lead to what was just and noble, good and 
beautiful. They were used later to glorify and at the same time to mock 
29 Kevane, p. 22. 
30 Plato, The Republic. Bk. X, 595a - 608a, pp. 277ff. 
26 
the gods and goddesses in the Roman theatres. These were the very 
gods and goddesses that any conservative, pagan Roman citizen would 
say made Rome great. 
It was Ellpersmann's point that even after Christianity had become 
the official religion of the Roman Empire, the catholic church did not set 
up its own schools of learning. This was something we would think she 
would have done after the pagan rule of Julian, the Apostate 31 Instead 
what the catholic church did was to allow its members to attend the 
pagan schools in which the classical methodology of education was 
employed and the liberal arts were taught. Here the classical poets 
were read, the refined techniques of rhetoric were practiced, and the 
philosophical methods of dialectics were mastered. Having been 
schooled in this classical methodology, the student was equipped to 
make his contribution to the catholic, Roman society. The same 
expectations were demanded of the pagan student, except that he did 
not recognize Jesus as the teacher of Truth. 
These schools, for Marrou, were not separated from the 
31 Gerard Ellspermann, Attitude of Early Christian Latin Writers Toward Pagan_ 
Literature and Learning. (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1949), pp. 1 
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Hellenistic culture. They were expressions of it. The best of what one 
found in these schools one found in the Roman culture. A civilization 
must achieve its true form before it can create the education in which 
it was reflected. "Classical education did not attain its own distinctive 
form until after the great epoch of Greek civilization. We have to wait 
until the Hellenistic era before we find it in full possession of its specific 
forms, its own curricula and methods."' 
Isocrates' School and the Rhetorical Tradition 
Another of Marrou's points was that by the time the youthful 
Augustine went to the schools in Carthage, rhetoric had overtaken 
philosophy as the all-inclusive discipline. By the end of the fourth 
century it was far more worthwhile to master rhetoric's refined 
techniques than to become a master of the Socratic dialogue. If we 
don't grasp this shift in emphasis in the classical methodology of 
education, we will fail to grasp the change that occurred in Augustine's 
life at his conversion and yet the need to retain the place of rhetoric's 
tools in the proclaimation of the truths of the Scripture. 
The Athenian, Isocrates, 436-338 B.C., was the founder of the 
32 Marrou, p. xiii. 
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rhetorical school which soon came into competition with the more 
philosophic Platonic schools for the minds of the Greek youth. 
. . . two forms of culture are typified by Plato and 
Isocrates: the philosophical and the rhetorical. Of 
these the dominant member was unquestionably the 
second, which left a profound impression on all 
manifestation of the Hellenistic spirit. For the very 
great majority of students, higher education meant 
taking lessons from the rhetor, learning the art of 
eloquence from him. (As John Chrysostom had done 
from Libaniusi The fact must be emphasized from the 
start. On the level of history Plato had been defeated: 
posterity had not accepted his educational ideas. The 
victor, generally speaking was Isocrates, and Isocrates 
became the educator first of Greece and then of the 
whole ancient world. His success had already been 
evident when the two were alive, and it became more 
and more marked as the generations wore on. Rhetoric 
is the specific object of Greek education and the 
highest Greek culture.' 
What made Plato's academy so foreboding to many was that he 
demanded of his students a series of studies so complex and difficult 
that most students did not complete them. All this he did under the 
illusion that perfect wisdom and perfect knowledge could be known 
about all things, and subjects that distracted from the pursuit of this 
33 Ibid., pp. 267-268. 
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pure knowledge were banished from the city. 
. . . we know that Plato was violently critical of the 
poets who in his own time were considered classics--
especially Homer: but his criticism went beyond the 
tragic poets to the part played by myths generally in 
the traditional education of Greek children. . . . Plato 
condemned the poets because their myths were lies 
giving a false picture of the gods and heroes and one 
that was unworthy of their perfection. The poets' art, 
being a product of illusion, was pernicious because it 
was inconsistent with Truth--to which all education 
should be subordinated--and because it distracted the 
mind from its proper end-- the attainment of rational 
knowledge." 
Plato's concern for Truth posed the question whether the goal of 
education should be artistic and poetic or truth-seeking and scientific. 
The question lingered on though, and both expressions were seen in the 
writings of Augustine. 
It was Isocrates and his school of rhetoric, on the other hand, that 
opposed Plato's concern for pure Truth. Platonic Truth wasn't practical, 
thought Isocrates. In the area of human affairs of what to do and what 
to say, for example, there can never be a precise science. `The 'genuinely 
cultivated' man-- ritrra i 6 cuuevoc-- says Isocrates, is not the man who 
knows pure Truth but is the kind of person who has a gift for 'hitting 
" Ibid., p. 109. 
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upon' the right solution or at least the solution that is most nearly right, 
the best in the circumstances-- IC_ 61 1 Pos. and this is because he has the 
right 'opinion' —6,00.'5 
In The Republic Plato dismissed "doxa"-- the popular opinion that 
the masses agreed upon-- as being the opposite of wonder. It was this 
"wonder" (Augustine called it "longing" or "yearning") that was for Plato 
the beginnings of the philosopher king but for Augustine the beginnings 
of the godly happy man or woman. For 'example, the person who saw 
beyond the cock fight to a similarity in the way all cocks fight" or who 
saw beyond the graceful movements of a dancer-- to Beauty, was the 
person who longed for [wondered about] God.37 For Plato this gift of 
wonder and the exercise of reason was the beginning of Wisdom and the 
discovery of the Highest Good. The pursuit of Plato's long-sought-after 
wisdom of justice, for which all of his students strove, ended up in no 
real city, for Plato's city was a city of ideas, a dream city. For Augustine 
the pursuit of the happy life (beata vita) ended up in a real city, the City 
35 Ibid., p. 133. 
36 Cf. Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. VIII, par. XXVI, p. 51. 
37 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XI, par. XXXIV, p. 137. 
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of God. 
For Isocrates Plato's concerns did not take care of immediate, 
practical concerns. These could best be handled through the gift of 
polished oratory. 
In the real city on earth, as Julian the Apostate, who modeled his 
emperorship after Platonic principles, found out, the philosopher king 
was an object of ridicule. His city eventually met with failure because 
ridicule could have been a reason for his death." "There was no point in 
attempting to mount into the heavens of Ideas or in playing about with 
paradoxes: for the purpose of living properly what we need was not new 
and surprising ideas but established good sense, traditional wisdom."" 
What Isocrates tried to foster in his disciples was the ability to make 
decisions, a type of intuitive grasp of the complexity of human affairs and 
a perception of the imponderable of human affairs.4° For him there 
became a connection between rhetoric and morals. The intimate bond 
between form and content was inseparable. This demanded a sensitivity 
. 38 Lebanius, Lebanius Selected Works, vol. I, trans., intro., and notes by A. F. Norman. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 285. 
39 Marrou, p. 133. 
44:1 Ibid., p. 134. 
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of thought and a sense for different meanings, that was difficult to 
express in conceptual ideas. These were the things that the poets make 
you feel, the very poets that Plato wanted to expel from his city. Science 
and the search for Truth can never attain this. "The result is that an 
`oratorical' kind of education, which in appearance is entirely a matter of 
aesthetics, whose one aim is to create 'wizards with words,' is in fact the 
most effective way of developing subtlety of thought.' For Augustine 
it became not only a means of making a living but also a means of 
teaching young people the skills that led toward the emptiness of vain 
glory. 
Isocrates' Academy was practical. He, too, educated his students 
for the political life, "preferring to teach them to be able to form sensible 
opinions about things that were useful rather than spend time in hair-
splitting about points that were utterly useless."' 
Cicero's Hortensius 
Nearly four centuries before Augustine and four centuries after 
Isocrates, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) sensed one reason the Roman Empire 
41  
42 Ibid., p. 133. 
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(which he loved so much and fought to keep alive) was dying was because 
the teaching of rhetoric and the practice of it led to so little Truth. He 
felt that the reason we, as human beings, had an advantage over brute 
creatures or barbarians was that we can reproduce our thoughts in 
words, both written and oral. This culture of the word, since the days of 
Plato, had led humanity out of its brutish barbarian existence to the 
cultured Roman condition of having educated citizens. This culture of the 
word, the logos, must be first and foremost a philosophical culture of 
Truth. This must not degenerate into a development of mere powers of 
speech and persuasion, divorced from content and substance and Truth.' 
"This basic concept of human excellence ran through Cicero's 
philosophical and educational works like a gold thread, seeking to bind the 
Roman world with its native virtue to the best in Greek heritage of 
paidela."44  
Ten years after his conversion and some twenty-two years after 
this recorded encounter with Cicero's Hortensius, Augustine wrote in 
Book III of his Confessions-- 
43 Kevane, p. 47. 
44 Ibid. 
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Among such companions in this unsettled age of 
mine I pursued my studies of the books of eloquence, 
a subject in which I longed to make my name for 
myself, though my reason for this was damnable and 
mere wind, being simply joy in human vanity. In the 
normal course of study I came across a book by Cicero, 
a man whose style, though not his heart, is almost 
universally admired. This book of his contains an 
exhortation to philosophy; it is called Hortensius. Now 
it was this book which altered my way of feeling, 
turned my prayers to you, Lord, yourself, and gave me 
different ambitions and desires. Every vain hope 
suddenly became worthless to me; my spirit was filled 
with an extraordinary and burning desire for the 
immortality of wisdom, and now I began to rise, so that 
I might return to you. I was in my nineteenth year 
(my father having died two years previously), and I 
might be assumed to be spending money my mother 
sent on sharpening my tongue; but it was not for the 
purpose of sharpening my tongue that I had used this 
book of Cicero's; what moved me was not the style, but 
the matter. 
I was on fire then, my God, I was on fire to leave 
earthly things behind and fly back to you, nor did I 
know what you would do with me; for with you is 
wisdom. But that book inflamed me with the love of 
wisdom (which is called "philosophy" in Greek).' 
Such an influence had this book on Augustine, that after his con-
version and before his baptism, at his retirement and place of therapy, 
Cassiciacum, he insisted that those with him read it. "It produced in them 
' Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Trans. by Edward B. Pusey, intro. by 
Harold C. Gardiner. ( New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1964), Bk. III, cap. IV, 
p. 56. 
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a part of the effect of which the saint desired.' Retiring from the vain 
pursuits of teaching the hollow principles of rhetoric, Augustine 
consciously worked out his Christian educational philosophy. He echoed 
Plato when he showed concern that Licentius, his prize student, spent too 
much time with poetry.' What separated Augustine's educational goals 
from the pagan educational goals of his time was his quest for Wisdom 
and Truth and the Highest Good. The absence of these forced him to 
resign from the school of rhetoric. The resultant modifications of these 
will be seen in his de Ordine and de Doctrina Christiana. They can be 
seen in his plea to put all truth in service to the Lord. 
The Classical Weltanschauung before Augustine 
During the centuries preceding Augustine, the Roman outlook on 
life which overrode all of life, including the worship of the Roman gods 
and the goals of the classical methodology of education, was the deeply 
embedded notion of Moira or fate. This was expressed poignantly in the 
philosophical systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism. They responded to 
the deep--seated convictions within Greek and Roman cultures and 
46Kevane, p. 60. 
"Ibid. 
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concluded that the tragic and fateful happenings in life had no real 
answer. The mature Hellenistic person did what he could with what was 
sure to come. The Stoics promoted emotional restraint. The Epicureans 
promoted licentious living within limits. Platonism and Neo-Platonism did 
not do a much better job in giving an answer to Moira. Their answer 
appealed to the immortality of the immaterial soul and stated that evil 
was not a substance, as Manichaeism insisted, but a "turning away into 
separateness: its very existence assumed the existence of an order . . . . 
It was the self-willed part that was diminished, by losing contact with 
something bigger and more vital than itself.' That which is the "bigger 
and more vital" is the One, Unchangeable God who encompassed all 
change and all evil, too. 
For, Plotinius' universe was a continuous, active 
whole, which could not admit brutal cleavages and no 
violent irruptions. Each being in it drew strength and 
meaning from its dependence on this living continuum. 
Evil, therefore, was only a turning away into 
separateness: its very existence assumed the existence 
of an order, which was flouted while remaining no less 
real and meaningful. It was the self-willed part that 
was diminished by losing contact with something bigger 
and more vital than itself." 
48 Brown, p. 99. 
49 Ibid. 
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But reading the panergyrics of Libanius (especially his never-
delivered panergyric after the sudden death of his hero, Julian, the 
Apostate), we sense a defensiveness and a self-justification against the 
harshness of life in his times. This could explain why rhetoric, which had 
refined its techniques over the centuries since the days of Isocrates, 
becomes the chief means of defense against a harsh, cruel Roman world. 
We find that rhetoric becomes a means of self-glorification and self-
promotion, yea even a means of giving to another, especially at the time 
of death, immortality. But behind the persuasive words of the speaker 
of a panergyric at a Roman funeral is the notion that fate (moira) has 
once again prevailed. Fate is stronger than the great Roman gods that 
the young learned about in the grammar schools; it is more pervasive 
than philosophy, which the thinkers of the day are disciplined in; and 
even the best orator would fall victim to it. Its end is to return all things 
from which they came. Kevane calls it "the myth of the eternal return".' 
Kevane read this already in Plato's Phaedrus. 
. . . we find that the cyclic doctrine lies at the very root 
of his theory of knowledge based on pre-existence and 
5° Kevane, p. 11. Kevane quoting from B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. HI. 
(New York: Bigelow and Brown), pp. 405-6. [Plato writes of this in chapter 57 of 
Paedo]. 
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thus becomes the foundation of his paideia of 
reminiscence. `For the revolution of the spheres.' he 
writes, 'carries the immortal souls around, and they 
behold the world beyond . . . And the intelligent soul . 
.. feeding upon the sight of truth is replenished, until 
the revolution of the world brings her round again to 
the same place.' Plato at times speaks of fate in terms 
of an iron necessity, . .51  
In the eyes of many weak Roman Christians, Christianity, too, fell 
under the power of Moira. Such was the conclusion of the proud Roman 
citizens who saw their beloved, and once proud, city of Rome fall to the 
Vandals under the leadership of Alaric in 410. Such was the report of the 
refugees who fled to North Africa to speak to Augustine in Hippo. They 
longed for the old days when the Roman gods were worshiped, for it 
seemed to them that it was Christianity's fault that their beloved Rome 
had fallen to ruin. They longed to return to their deep-seated Roman 
conservativism when the Roman gods, who seemed to be in control, still 
ruled. They, with their pagan relatives and neighbors were saying, "if 
Rome had not turned into Christianity officially, this disaster would not 
have happened." Under all their pleading words was the conviction that 
fate (Moira) had a way of bringing the worst to the best. We found in 
51 Ibid., p. 12. Kevane uses the myth of Er, The Republic, Bk. X, 614B-621D. 
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Augustine's Christian educational writings a powerful philosophical and 
theological antidote to their fate-filled perception of history. 
The Classical Educational Curriculum 
To see how the classical methodology of education impacted 
Augustine's answer, a review of its curriculum will be helpful for our 
purposes. As we have already stated, the classical education methodology 
did not change much from the time of Plato to Augustine, some eight 
hundred years. The following was Ellspermann's description of the 
classical curriculum. 
At the age of twelve the boy was sent to the 
grammaticus. Along with purely grammatical studies, 
punctuation and accent for the purpose of speaking 
and writing correctly in Greek and Latin, poetry was 
thoroughly studied. In Greek, Homer came first. 
Other poets were Hesiod, the dramatists, and the lyric 
writers in selections. Quintilian thought it best to 
begin with Vergil. Besides Vergil, the other Latin poets 
chiefly read were Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Plautius, 
Terence, Horace, Lucan and Statius. In connection with 
detailed explanation of the poets, the grammaticus 
gave his students lectures on metre, poetry in general, 
mythology, philosophy, astronomy, history, or music. 
Thus a general education was obtained. Here, too, 
many selections from the poets were committed to 
memory, and there was much practice in verse making. 
The poets then, were the first main object of study. As 
exercises in prose, the young students reproduced 
stories in their own words, turned poetry into prose. 
Pupils who were not to go further in their studies, i. e., 
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to the rhetor, were given a training in elementary 
rhetoric. They thus completed "orbis ille doctrinae 
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The crown of Roman education was rhetoric (at least 
by the late fourth century), or the art and practice of 
public speaking. The Roman youth entered the school 
of rhetoric when he was sixteen years old. Here he 
read the historians and orators, and the reading was 
accompanied by the study of technicalities of style as 
exhibited in the works of the masters or oratory and 
prose. The principal aim of the rhetor was to make a 
man able to speak correctly. Written exercises, 
discourses, refutations, panegyrics, and development of 
matters of common knowledge first rendered the 
faculties supple. The rhetor then employed his student 
in declamation proper, making him deliver an 
exposition on some subject, such as a case of 
conscience or a fictitious suit. The emphasis was on 
form; the matter or content was more or less 
indifferent. Declamation, introduced into Rome about 
84 B.C. became the supreme test and crowning exercise 
in rhetoric, success in which was the ambition of pupils 
and the pride of their parents. Declamations were 
classed as suasoriae, where a certain course of action 
was debated; and as controversiae, where some point 
was affirmed or denied. The training under the rhetor 
was designed to equip pupils for the vocations of public 
life--for deliberative and forensic oratory. Such 
exercises, incredible though the situations might be, 
imparted through the mental gymnastics involved a 
nimbleness of mind, a quickness in propounding an 
argument, a versality in treatment, and a finish in 
speech, almost amazing. Though such a system has 
obvious advantages, yet from a practical standpoint it 
could be empty, puerile, vain, lacking virility and 
seriousness. The range was narrow and unreal; 
threadbare themes were discussed. Hence arose the 
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far-fetched absurdities with which the declamations 
abound." 
II 
The Classical Methodology of Education in de Ordine 
Unlikely as it may seem, Augustine's Christian educational 
philosophy answered for him the central issues of life: does the order of 
God's providence embrace everything good and evil? If God created all 
things good, where did evil come from? Was evil there from all eternity? 
Or did evil begin in time? These questions plagued him all his life from 
the time he joined the Manichean sect during his school days in Carthage 
until he wrote the last chapters of his seminal defense for the Christian 
faith, Concerning The City of God against the Pagans after the downfall 
of the city of Rome. One could guess that Augustine was thinking of the 
same theological problem years later when the Vandals began to ransack 
his city of Hippo during the year of his death 430. 
We will consider in depth de Ordine, and we will find that the goal 
Augustine has in mind for the well-trained godly man was that he should 
see beyond the catastrophes and tragedies and changes of life to a greater 
52 Ellspermann, pp. 5-6. 
42 
and deeper plan of God. By searching his soul (something which 
Augustine felt few in his day did) and discovering God behind the order 
to all things, Augustine's student would be led to live the happy life, 
Beata vita. 
The chief cause of this error is that man knows not 
himself. Now for acquiring this self-knowledge, he 
needs a constant habit of withdrawing from things of 
the senses and of concentrating his thoughts within 
himself, and holding it there. This they alone succeed 
in doing, who definitely mark out in solitude the 
impressions of opinion which the course of daily life 
has made, or correct them by means of the liberal 
branches of learning." 
At the end of this educational piece, written in dialogue form, 
Augustine wrote poetically out of pure excitement over what the soul 
discovers when it withdraws from the sensual experience and 
contemplates God. 
But when the soul has properly adjusted and disposed 
itself and has rendered itself harmonious and beautiful, 
then it will venture to see God (audebit jam Deum 
videre), the very source of all truth and the very 
Father of Truth. 0 great God, What kind of eyes shall 
" Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, cap. I, par. III, pp. 10-11. Cujius erroris maxima 
causa est, quod homo sibi ipse est incognitus. Qui tames at se noscat, 
magna opus habet consuetudine recedendi a sensibus et animum is seipsum 
colligendi atque in seipso retinendi. Quod ii tantum asseqiiuntur, qui plagas 
quasdam opinionum, quas vitae quotidianae cursus infligit, aut solitudine inurunt aut 
liberalibus medicant disciplinis. 
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those be! How pure! How beautiful! How powerful! 
How constant! How serene! God blessed! And what is 
that which they see! (Quid aurem est illud quod 
vident?) What is it? I ask? (Quid, quaeso?) What 
should we surmise? What should we believe? What 
should we say? Everyday expressions present 
themselves, but they have been rendered sordid by 
things of least worth. I shall say no more, except that 
to us is promised a vision of beauty (nisi promitti nobis 
aspectum pulchritudinus)--the beauty of whose 
imitation all other things are beautiful, and by 
comparison with which all other things are beautiful in 
comparison with which all other things are unsightly. 
Whoever will have glimpsed this beauty--and he will see 
it, who lives well, prays well, studies well (videbit 
aurem qui bene vivit, bene orat, bene studet).54 
As we can see Augustine's educational goals, though highly 
influenced by the impractical concerns of Plato's world of ideas, are 
applied to practical concerns of the inconsistencies of life that Romans 
experienced in the late fourth century. 
How will it ever trouble him why another man, desiring 
to have children, has them not (cur alius optans 
habere filos non habeat), while another man casts out 
his own offspring as being unduly numerous; why one 
man hates children before they are born, and another 
man loves them after birth; or how it is not absurd 
that nothing will come to pass which is not with God--
and therefore it is inevitable that all things come into 
being in accordance with order--and nevertheless God 
is not petitioned in vain? (Ex quo necesse est ordine 
54 Ibid., Bk. II, cap. XIX, pp. 166-167. 
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omina fieri et tamen non frustra Deum rogari?)55 
Augustine's well-trained man is a tranquil, happy person who has 
learned to look beyond the changes, tragedies, inconsistencies and 
injustices in life to the whole of life. 
Finally, how will any burdens, dangers, scorns, or smiles 
of fortunes disturb a just man? In this world of sense 
it is indeed necessary to examine carefully what time 
and place are, so that what delights in a portion of 
place and time, may be understood to be far less 
beautiful than the whole of which it is a portion. And 
furthermore, it is clear to the learned man that what 
displeases in a portion, displeases for no other reason 
than because the whole with which that portion 
harmonizes wonderfully, it is not seen; but that in the 
intelligible world, every part is as beautiful and perfect 
as the whole. (In illo vero mundo intelligibili, 
quamliber pat-tern, tanquam totum, pulchram esse 
atque perfectum.76 
What did the life of one who followed the prescriptions of Augustine 
look like? After the godly person has gone through Augustine's 
curriculum, how shall he live? Augustine's expectations were quite clear. 
He wrote, "Youth devoted to this science ought (Adolescentibus ergo 
studiosis) . . . " 
55 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XIX, par. LI, pp. 166-167. 
56 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XIX, par. LI, pp. 166-169. 
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1) to live so as to refrain from all wantonness, from 
the enticement of gluttony, from excessive care and 
adornment of the body, from silly practices of games, 
from dullness of sleep and sloth, from jealousy, 
detraction, and envy, from the ambition for honor and 
power, and from the unrestrained desire of praise. 
2) to be convinced that the love of money is an 
unfailing poison for all their hopes. (Amorem aurem 
pecuniae totius suae spei certissimum venenum esse 
credant). 
3) to do nothing half-heartedly, nothing rashly. In case 
of faults of their associates, let them either cast out all 
anger, or so restrain it that it will be like anger 
dismissed. Let them hate no one. (Neminem oderint). 
4) not to be unwilling to correct vices. (Nulla vitia 
non curare velint.) Let them take care especially not 
to be excessive in vengeance or stinting in forgiveness. 
5) [to] punish only what can be improved, (Nihil 
puniant quod non valeat ad melius) and favor nothing 
that may become worse. 
6) [to] regard their own fellowmen and all those over 
whom authority has been given to them respectfully. 
Let them be so obedient that it would be embarrassing 
to give them commands, and let them rule so 
considerably that it becomes a pleasure to obey them. 
7) not to be troublesome to one who is reluctant. 
8) [to] avoid enmities, bear them patiently, and end 
them most speedily. 
9) to observe this one familiar proverb: not to do to 
anyone what they would not have done to themselves. 
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(Nemini faciant quod pati nolunt). 
10) not . . . to undertake the administration of the 
State unless they are matured. (Republican non 
administrare, nisi perfecti). 
11) not [to] think himself (those who turn to these 
studies late in life) bound by no other precept, in fact, 
he will all the more easily observe those things in 
mellowed age. 
12) [to] have friends in all circumstances in life. 
13) [to] live in a fitting and decent manner, supported 
by faith, hope and love, let them have God the object 
of their worship, their thinking, and their serving. 
(Deum colant cogitant quaeranl fide, spe, charitate 
subnixi.). 
14) [to] desire tranquility, and a definite course for 
their own studies and for those of all their associates 
and for themselves and for whomsoever else such 
things are possible, a good and quiet life. (Et sibi 
quibusque possunt mentem bonam pacatamque 
vitam).57 
Can There Be a Perceived Order of Reality? 
The purpose of recording the discourse at the baths of Cassiciacum 
between newly converted Augustine and his group of companions 
(Alypius, Navigius, Licentius, and Trygetius) and his mother, Monica was 
to develop an answer of how one reached these goals in a world filled with 
57 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. VIII, par. XXV, pp. 118-121. 
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change, discouragements, and evil. Could these things have happened by 
chance? Could it even be possible that God willed them? Or was there 
a deeper plan, that most do not sense, by which all things were arranged 
and under God's Providence? 
Licentius, the son of Augustine's benefactor, Romanianus, played 
the most dominant role in the dialogue, perhaps because he, above all the 
rest, was fascinated by and indulged in the writing of poetry, an activity 
that Plato, as we have noted, opposed in Bk X of The Republic.' It was 
Licentius that Augustine wanted to instruct by means of dialogue to 
become the wise, godly man who could transcend the many assaults on 
the Christian's life to live the happy life, beata vita. By addressing the 
whole work to little-known Zenobius," a secretary in the imperial 
government, a magister memoriae, we sensed that Augustine intended 
his work to have a far--reaching impact upon Roman life. By addressing 
Zenobius, Augustine demonstrated that he was a total Roman citizen 
ss Plato, The Republic. Bk. X 595a - 608, p. 429. [In his interpretative essay Allan Bloom 
goes to great length to explain why Plato banished the poets from his ideal city.] 
" Augustine, de Ordine. p. 181. The footnote mentions that the only other sources of 
information that refer to Zenobius are found in two of Augustine's letters. In one of these 
letters we discover that he had been made a magister memoriae, i.e., a secretary in the 
imperial government. 
48 
because his educational vision, found in de Ordine, was thoroughly 
immersed in the Roman culture, yet Christian. 
At the outset Augustine declared his statement of purpose, "to 
perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then 
to see or to explain the order of the entire universe by which this world 
is truly held together and governed--that, Zenobius, is a very difficult and 
rare achievement for men."' Augustine knew that most people do not 
spend time doing the thing that he has set his group to do. It called for 
his participants to ponder (curae)61 or to care about these matters, for 
it can only be done by those who marvel or wonder Onirabilisr about 
things. These people were truly rare. Once one wondered about what 
has been set forth by Augustine one became aware that his problem has 
many aspects to it, for mere observation of the events of the Roman 
world will lead one to the conclusion that "either divine Providence did 
not reach to the outer limits of things or that surely all evils were 
60 Augustine, De Ordine. pp. 6-7. Ordinem rerum, Zenobi, consequi ac tenere cuique 
proprium, turn vero universitatis quo coercetur ac regitur hic mundus, vel videre vel 
pandere difficillimum hominibus atque rarissimum est. 
61 
 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. I, par. I, p. 6. 
62 
 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. HI, par. VIII, p. 18. 
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committed by the will of God." (aut certe mala omnia Del voluntate 
committi)" 
Even a human being was not held responsible for what he could not 
do or prevent. How could God? But if one said that there was no order 
to things, then one would have to say that either things occur by chance 
or were not part of the effect of a design or were not part of the hidden 
control of divine majesty. 
In leading his group of vacation retreaters to a satisfying answer to 
the problem he posed, Augustine wanted Licentius to be committed to the 
conviction about order, which he did on the morning after the beginning 
of the discourse. Licentius' definition was "Order is that by which are 
governed all things that God has constituted."64  
But before Augustine led Licentius to this conclusion he appealed 
to him about a common annoyance that he cannot explain--his 
sleeplessness caused by an irregular water fall. "I was awake, therefore, 
as I said, when the sound of water flowing past at the rear of the baths 
63 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. I, par. I, pp. 6-7. 
64 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. X, par. XXVIII, pp. 54-55. Ordo est, inquit, per quern 
aguntur omnia quae Deus constituit. 
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came to my ears; and it was noticeably louder than usual."' Driven by 
the gift of wonder, Augustine asked, "What was its cause?" Licentius, who 
was also awake, working on his poetry, was frightened by some mice. 
What were the reasons for these occurrences? Was it the leaves that fell 
into the spring that back-up the stream that caused the water to flow 
irregularly? What was it that caused Licentius to respond to his muse, 
Calliope?" By these Socratic questions Augustine drew out of Licentius 
the longing to care about and ponder over the deeper things, the 
philosophical things, and nudged him away from his poetic flights to think 
about the problem Augustine has set before him. Being a thinking man, 
Licentius concluded, "nothing is done apart from order."' Licentius was, 
as Plato had once strongly urged, moved away from things poetic to seek 
the Truth in these matters, and he concluded that it was a higher pursuit 
than what a soothsayer did when predicting the future on the basis of 
what a mouse did.68 "For Philosophy--as I have begun to believe as you 
65 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. VI, p. 17. 
66 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. VIII, p. 19. 
67 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. VIII pp. 22-23. Nam praeter ordinem nihil mihi fieri 
videtur. 
68 Cf. ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. IX p. 21. 
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prove it day by day--is our true and tranquil abode" (Vera et inconcussa 
nostra habitatio).' From then on he was convinced that he would defend 
order in all things (ordinem rerum)7° He then made his commitment to 
order even deeper by stating "that even though someone were to worst 
me in this debate, I should attribute even that fact to the order of things, 
and not to reasonless chance."' 
Augustine moved the discussion further by posing to Licentius 
whether order was either good or bad and whether there can be anything 
that is opposite of order. "Nothing" (NihiO "how indeed can anything be 
opposed to that which has seized and held the whole?"' "Then can error 
be opposed to order?" Trygetius asked. Licentius was equally as adamant 
as before. 
Not at all; Licentius replies. For I see that no one goes 
wrong without a cause. Moreover, the series of causes 
is contained in order, and error not only arises from a 
cause, but it gives origin to something else of which it 
69 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. IX pp. 20-23. 
7° Cf ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. IX, pp. 20 & 23. 
71 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. IX, pp. 22-23. Adam hoc nulli temeritati, sed 
rerum ordini tribuam. 
72 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VI, par. XV, pp. 32-33. Nam quomodo esse contrariium 
quidquam potest ei rei quae totum occupavit totum obtinuit? 
52 
is itself the cause. Wherefore, insomuch as it is not 
apart from order, so neither can it be opposed to 
order. Quamobrem quo extra ordinem non est eo non 
potest ordini esse contrarius." 
Augustine sensed now that Licentius, with his firm defense of order 
was becoming like a dear son of his, because, even though Augustine had 
lost hope in him with regards to the lower branches (mediocres litteras) 
of learning, now he was into the very heart of philosophy (in mediam 
venire philosophiam). Like a true Platonist who responded to an idea 
just because it was an idea, Licentius exclaimed. "Both good and bad 
things are in order." (et bona et mala in ordine sunt)74 
Trygetius is not so easily convinced, "what more impious statement 
could be made than that evil things themselves are comprised in order; 
for surely God loves order." (Certe enim Deus amat ordinemr 
Licentius agrees but wonders whether it then follows that evils come from 
God and that God even loves evils. (Ex quo sequitur ut et mala sint a 
summo Deo et mala Deus diligat) i6 
73 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VI, par. XV, pp. 32-35. 
74 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VI, par. XVII, pp. 34-35. 
75 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VI, par. XVII, pp. 34-37. 
76 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VI, par. XVII, pp. 36 & 37. 
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It is now Augustine's turn to insert his wisdom. 
And he greatly loves order precisely because by 
it he loves not evils. But how can evils themselves be 
"not in order," although God does not love them? Now 
this itself is the order of evils: that they be not loved 
by God. And does this order of things seem to you 
unimportant that God loves things good and does not 
love things evil? And thus evil which God does not 
love, are not apart from order; and nevertheless He 
does love order itself. This very thing he loves: to love 
good things, and not to love bad things--and this itself 
is a thing of magnificent order and of divine 
arrangement. " 
What the reader of this discourse should sense by now is that 
Augustine has really two orders (ordines) in mind. The first is order, 
the sequence, of events in life, including both good and evil events; but he 
also has in mind an educational sequence by which the student is 
equipped to grasp that all events in life are held together in a whole. But 
Augustine seems to suggest that one has to be willing to pursue Truth in 
a Platonic, dialectic manner in order to grasp this. Only a few are 
capable of doing this, but the pursuit and the ends to which it leads--to 
77 Ibid., Bk. chap. VI, par. XVII, pp. 36-37. Et ordinem ideo multum diligit, qula per 
eum non diligat mala. At vero ipsa mala qui possunt non esse in ordine, cum Deus illa 
non diligat? Nam iste ipse est malorum ordo ut non diligantur a Deo. An parvus rerum 
ordo tibi videtur, ut et bona Deus diligat et non diligat mala? Ita nec praeter ordinem 
sunt mala, quae non diligit Deus, er ipsum tamen ordinem hoc ipsum enim diligat 
diligere bona, et non diligere mala, quod est magni ordinis et divine dispositions. 
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to know the Highest Good, the Truth, the Whole, the Unchangeable and 
the Beautiful--makes for the wise person of God. In longing for and 
seeking this Highest Good, Augustine appeals to the Platonic school of 
thought and rejects the rhetorical school of thought that had occupied 
his youthful life for the twelve years before he sought a retreat at 
Cassiciacum. 
The following morning, with a clear mind, Augustine concludes, 
Order is that which will lead to God, if we hold to it 
during life; and unless we do hold to it during life, we 
shall not come to God. And if I am not deceived by my 
affection for you, we now believe and hope that we 
shall come to God. Most carefully, therefore, ought 
this question to be resolved and worked out by us.78 
Now Augustine moves his companions, although Alypius and Navigius 
have gone off to Milan, to the point where he wants them and he moves 
us the readers, too, to go beyond what we sensually experience to wonder 
about what our senses inform us. But he concludes that it is not wise to 
push the issue any further, lest, while Augustine longs to teach order, he 
7B Ibid., pp. 51-53. Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in vita, perducet ad Deum, et 
quem nisi tenuerimus in vita, non perveniemus ad Deum. Perventuros aurem 
nos jam, nisi me animus de vobis fallit, praesumimus et speramus. 
Diligentissime igitur inter nos ista quaestio versari debet atque dissolvi. 
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should "exceed moderation, the parent of order."' The comment, which 
appears near the end of the educational piece, reminds one of Aristotle's 
Golden Mean in his Nicomachean Ethics. "Now it [virtue, arete] is a 
means between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which 
depends on defect; and again it is a means because the vices respectively 
fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while 
virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate."' 
He concludes at one point that it is even by this order that the 
great God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit has "for our sake deigned to take 
up and dwell in this body of our own kind, yet the more lowly it appears, 
so much more it is replete with clemency and the farther and the wider 
remote form a certain characteristic pride of ingenious men."" 
(ingeniosorum superbia)82  
By the "ingenious men" Augustine means the Platonists. Augustine 
79 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XIX, par. L., pp. 164-165. Modum excedam, qui pater est 
ordinis. 
80 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Bk. II, chap. 6, 1107a, trans., W. D. Ross in 
Introduction to Aristotle, ed. & general introduction by Richard McKeon. (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1947) , p. 340. 
81 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, chap. V, par. XVI, p. 101. 
82 Ibid., p. 184. 
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can agree with them on many points--the gift of wonder, the ascendance 
to God by the perceptions of the soul, the Socratic questionings of what 
the senses grasp, and a dialectical process of a group like the one at 
Cassiciacum who seeks the Truth behind all things; but he cannot, and 
they will not, agree with him concerning the incarnation of God. This 
the Platonists cannot fathom. How could the One, the Highest Good, the 
Wisdom, the Truth, or the Logos become flesh? Over this central 
Christian teaching Augustine separates himself from the Platonists." 
"Therefore, God is governed, says Trygetius. What of 
it?" he replies. "Do you not admit that Christ is God, 
Who came to us by way of order, and says that he was 
sent by God the Father? If therefore God sent us 
Christ by way of order, and we admit that Christ is 
God, the God not only governs all things, but Himself 
is governed by order. 84 
Are there events that are outside God's order? Can things happen 
83 Augustine, de Ordine. pp. 184-185. Russell states that it is evident that this notion 
precluded not only the fact but even the possibility of the Incarnation when the Son of 
God assumed complete human nature in the unity of the Divine Person. This Augustine 
found incompatible with revealed truth. Other errors he found among the Platonist were 
a) that the world came into being necessarily and by a process of emanation; b) the 
doctrine of the transmigration of souls; c) the eternal duration of the world. 
84 Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. X, par. XXIX, pp. 54-55. Ergo agitur Deus, ait Trygetius. 
Et ille: Quid enim, inquit, Christum Deum negas, qui et ordine ad nos venit, et 
a Patre Deo missum esse se dicit? Si igitur Deus Christum ordine ad nos misit et 
Deum Christum esse non negamus, non solum agit omnia, sed agitur ordine etiam 
Deus. 
57 
by chance? Does God will evil? All these are not possible if order, the 
order that God governs, is behind everything. Evil itself can not destroy 
order nor can it be outside of order, but God includes it in his order. 
The Role of the Senses 
What is the role of man's senses in pursuing order? Do they 
deter or do they aid in attaining the Truth about order or do they 
detract? The two human senses that Augustine deals with are the sense 
of seeing, through which we detect movement and colors, and the sense 
of hearing, through which we detect sounds. It is by way of the sense of 
hearing that the waterfall, near where Augustine and his companions are 
asleep, leads them into a discussion on order. Most people would merely 
hear the waterfall. They would not ask what made it flow irregularly, and 
therefore keeps Augustine awake. Augustine's opinion of those who live 
only by their senses can be compared to the people who are chained and 
shackled to the far side of the cave wall in Plato's analogy of the cave.' 
They see flickering images against the cave wall of the images that the 
people on the parapet behind them carry back and forth. "They live 
85 Plato, The Republic. Bk. VII, 514A, pp. 193ff. 
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wretched lives, but they live.' Their existence is similar to that of a 
slave. They are slaves to the images that their senses perceive and to the 
opinions (doxa) of others. They lack the gift of wonder and the mind 
that questions. Living by the perceptions of the soul, on the other hand, 
one lives not merely to exist but one lives a happy life, (sed beate vivere 
satis sit).87 
Knowledge gained only by the senses is a knowledge of the lowest 
form for a human being. The acquisition of this knowledge is necessary 
for the development of the wise, godly person. It does not, however, lead 
him to be with God nor even to know himself. These two are essential 
for Augustine, but the education that comes through the senses is 
necessary for one's complete education." ". . . whoever knows only those 
things which the senses reach, seems to me to be not only not with God, 
but not even with himself.' This is the error of errors in the Greek 
world, as the Greek tragic dramatists would over and over point out. Lack 
86 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. VIII, par. XXIV, p. 47. vivunt miseri, vivunt 
tamen. 
87 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VII, par. XXIV, pp. 46-47. 
88 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. H, par. V, p. 77. 
89 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. II, par. V. 
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of self-awareness brought the hero to a tragic end. This sends the tragic 
Greek hero to the oracle at Delphi to hear and read the ancient truth, 
"Know Thy Self." The Greek tragic dramatists tell stories of the 
harshness of Greek life. 
But the perception of the senses is necessary, for Augustine. One 
cannot live in this world without the use of them. There are even traces 
of reason in the senses. One may be drawn away from more important 
matters to watch the bitter fight of two irrational cocks. This often 
happens in life. The senses perceive the bright colors of the two cocks, 
their irregular movements and the final outcome of their fight. These 
sense observations are needed before reason, the mind, and the soul can 
ask questions like, why do all cocks act similarly? What is common to all 
cock fights? Why do cocks fight for dominance over their hens?' But if 
the questions are not asked and the possible answers are not discussed in 
a dialectical manner, the spectators who observe the fight are no better 
than the people who are shackled to the far side of Plato's cave. Seven 
centuries before Augustine's Cassiciacum retreat Plato has Socrates ask 
9° Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 
1958), p. 158. 
91 Cf. Augustine, de Ordine, Bk. I, chap. VIII, par. XXV, p. 49. 
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of Glaucon, 
Isn't this at last the song itself that dialectic performs? 
It is in the realm of the intelligible, but it is imitated by 
the power of sight. We said that sight at last tries to 
look at the animals themselves and at the stars 
themselves and then finally at the sun itself. So, also 
when a man tries by discussion-- by means of argument 
without the use of any of the senses--to attain to each 
thing itself that is and doesn't give up before he grasps 
by intellect itself that which is good itself, he comes to 
the very end of the intelligible realm just as that other 
man was then at the end of the visible.' 
People who only live by their senses and the agreed upon opinion 
(doxa) of others will only live in the realm of the visible. They are chained 
to this life. They are shackled from seeing what the soul can perceive 
and to what the intellect can grasp. In the cruel, indifferent Roman 
world that Augustine lived, they will be confused and disappointed by the 
changes of life and end up complaining about God.93 "Thus it happens 
that whoever narrow-mindedly considers this life by itself alone, is 
repelled by its enormous foulness, and turns away in sheer disgust.' 
92 Plato, The Republic. Bk. VII, 532a, p. 211. 
93 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. I, par. I, p. 7. 
94 Ibid., pp. 92-93. Ita fir ut angusto animo ipsam solam quisque considerans, 
veluti magna repercussus foeditate aversetur. 
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The soul is our next topic in understanding more thoroughly 
Augustine's educational principles. The soul according to Augustine 
naturally seeks unity in all things. The very Latin word for soul, anima, 
is closely linked to unum or one. 
The soul returned to itself in this manner, understands 
what is the beauty of the universe; (quae sit 
pulchritudo universitatis intelligit) this term is 
evidently derived from the word unum (one). 
Wherefore, the beholding of oneness is not granted to 
that soul (animae) which wanders toward many objects 
and eagerly pursues mental beggary, which though it 
does not know it, can only be avoided by keeping aloof 
from the multitude; and I mean, not just the multitude 
of men, but all things that the senses reach. 
Multitudinem autem non hominum dico, sed omnium 
quae sensus attingit.' 
Augustine's Personal Journey to Faith Seeks Wholeness 
Having been influenced indirectly by the life and practices of the 
most extreme ascetic of his times, Anthony in Egypt," Augustine's 
Christian conversion draws him away from the things of this world. The 
garden outside of the house where Alypius and he are staying in Milan 
and the words of the child repeating his Latin phrase, toile lege, toile 
95 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. II, pp. 10-11. 
96 Augustine., The CorVessions, trans. by Rex Warner. (NewYork: New American 
Library, 1963), Bk. VIII, chap. VI, p. 171. 
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lege" are only the stimulus. The Bible passage from Romans that he 
opens to, "not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and 
wantonness, not in strife and envying, put you on the Lord Jesus Christ, 
and make not provision for the flesh in concupiscence" (Romans 13:13-
14)," only convinces him more that his soul needed a place to exercise its 
God-given ability to be one with God and away from the world. We can 
sense why Augustine theologically (philosophically) thinks it necessary to 
retreat from the colors and sounds of Milan to the Cassiciacum retreat. 
Here his soul wouldn't be as tempted to wander where his sense draws 
hint Here his soul could concentrate on the Oneness, the Wholeness, of 
life. It is in the city that the soul experiences want by the senses 
grasping only the separation of things. Ten years later in The 
Confessions Augustine would criticize the people of his times who live 
only by their senses and who 
go abroad to wonder at the heights of mountains, the 
huge waves of the sea, the broad streams of rivers, the 
vastness of the ocean, the turnings of the stars--and 
they do not notice themselves and they see nothing 
marvelous in the fact that when I mentioned all these 
things I was not seeing them with my eyes, yet I would 
97 Ibid., BK. VIII, chap. VIII - XII, pp. 174-182. 
98 Ibid., Bk. VIII, chap. XII, p. 183. 
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not have been able to speak of them unless these 
mountains and waves and rivers and stars (which I 
have seen) and the ocean (which I have heard about) 
had been visible to me inside, in my memory, and with 
the same great spatial intervals and proportions as if I 
were really seeing them outside myself." 
Memory as a Slave to the Mind 
His soul and the souls of his acquaintances need to detach 
themselves from the things of the world before they can practice the 
ancient method of discovering the Truth, the method of human dialogue. 
But memory is a key tool in leading Augustine's students out of the 
cave of unwisdom to the light of wisdom, for it is needed to retain what 
the student has heard from the philosopher, the lover of Wisdom.' It 
is needed in all the necessary and worthy branches of learning (honestas 
ac. necessaries disciplines). A wise man needs memory (memoria opus 
esse sapienti). Memory is a servant (servo tuo), yea, a slave of the soul. 
If it is used properly, it can lead you to the order of things.101 
Although memory occupies only a brief portion of Augustine's 
dialogue in de Ordine, it is essential in understanding Augustine's 
" Ibid., Bk. X, ch. VIII, p. 219. 
100 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, chap. II, par. VII, p. 83. 
101 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. II, par. VII, p. 81. 
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educational thoughts. A commentary on memory is found in the tenth 
book of The Confessions. Here we, too, find that memory is a slave of 
the mind' or the soul, for both mind and soul are the same thing for 
Augustine, "for whatever is in the mind is also in memory."' 
It is the soul, fed by the images of memory, that discovers order. 
The soul, if it is wise, holds fast to this order. In true Platonic fashion it 
devotes itself to philosophy. At first it introspects itself. As soon as this 
mode of learning has persuaded the soul that reason either is the soul 
itself or belongs to it, it is less trusting of the senses. It discovers, too 
that there is in reason nothing more excellent or dominant than 
numbers, or that reason is nothing else than number.' Reason is the 
capacity to analyze and to seek that which is a unity. The reasonable 
examination of numbers begins with the number one. Reason seeks the 
same thing that a soul seeks, that is, unity. It is Augustine who says "it 
is oneness that I seek, it is oneness that I love."' It is no surprise that 
102 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. II, par. V, p. 79. 
103 Augustine, The Confessions. Bk. X, chap. XVII,. p. 227. 
1°4 Augustine, de Ordine. p. 165. 
105 Ibid., p.  161. 
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he clung to and fought for so often in his life the one "catholic" 
expression of the church. 
In order to make sense of the evil in life, memory is important, for 
it feeds the rational soul that longs for a greater Whole. Once the highest 
Good is reached the wise, godly man fixes his gaze on the immovable God, 
"Who abides forever, for Whose presence there is no waiting, and of 
Whose absence there is no fearing, because by the fact that He truly is, He 
is always present. The wise man, the godly man, once he has arrived at 
this happy life, conserves it well and uses his memory sparingly.»106 
Therefore, the wise man in his pure enjoyment of God doesn't need 
memory because all that he needs is fulfilled in that one grand moment 
of contemplation. Yet, if he is to serve his fellowman, his soul needs what 
memory can give him, a recall of past events.' 
Reason Makes Sense out of Changes 
Memory is of greatest value in leading some one, as Augustine does 
Zenobius in de Ordine, from living on the level of the senses to living 
on the basis of the perceptions of one's soul. Memory informs the soul 
106 Augustine, de Ordine. BK. II, chap. II, par. VII, pp. 80-81. 
107 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. II, par. VII. p. 83. 
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so that reason can sort through what the senses give memory. Although 
the tenth book of The Confessions strikes the reader at first as a needless 
appendix to his spiritual autobiography, it is central to understanding 
Augustine's spiritual journey of moving from the Manichaean way of 
explaining evil as substance to obtaining true Wisdom where all of life, 
material as well as spiritual, is grasped as part of the whole and the happy 
godly life is lived. This lower life is lived by the senses, passions and lusts. 
Only memory itself can see that it is God (as Augustine so frequently 
points out in The Confessions) all along who is behind every event,' 
every tragedy that occurs in his life like the death of a dear unnamed 
friend,' every hollow rhetorical deception that the Manichean Faustus 
promoted,' the abrupt dismissal of his dear nameless mistress;" his 
resignation from his shop-talk,112 and the death of his mother in 
Ostia.' God, the highest Good, who changes not, who is present 
'° Augustine, The Confessions. Bk. V, chap. VIII, pp. 101-102. 
109 Ibid., Bk. IV. Chap. X, p. 79. 
11° Ibid., Bk. V, chap. VI, p. 96. 
Ill Ibid., Bk. VI, chap. XV, p. 133. 
112 Ibid., Bk. IX, chap. IV, p. 188. 
113 Ibid., Bk. IX, chap. X, pp, 200ff. 
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everywhere, is pursuing and guiding Augustine to the time of his 
conversion and baptism. God is the Truth, the Wisdom and the Highest 
Good, and who is behind the order of all things, but one does not arrive 
at this spiritual insight by living according to one's passions or one's 
senses. This lower level of living will lead one to pursue the prescriptions 
of this world. These prescriptions lead Augustine's father, Patricius, to 
want Augustine to pursue the vocation of a lawyer and for Augustine to 
rebel and pursue the life of fame and glory, the life of a rhetor. 
Like Cicero before him, Augustine, ever the academic, sees in the 
rhetoric of his day a hollowness and a vanity that glorifies the self. So 
rhetoric and its traditional classical goals to teach, to delight, and to 
persuade needs to be combined with the philosophical pursuits of 
Wisdom and Truth. Augustine knows from personal experience that the 
tools of rhetoric, when applied in a skillful manner, could impress and 
persuade the masses, but this does not make them worthwhile for the 
Roman Empire or for the education of the man or woman of God. What 
is needed, according to the recently converted Augustine, is a return to 
the rigorous and demanding Socratic pursuit of Truth, and this Augustine 
does from the beginning to the end of de Ordine. 
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Augustine's first impressions of Cicero's Hortensius had not 
changed. He was fully focused on the pursuit of Truth. Augustine saw 
that for the Christian there was a necessary need for Plato's concern for 
Truth, even if it had impractical consequences, so that Christianity could 
be freed from the Roman cultural pursuits that led to vain-glory. 
As a celibate and promoter of the monastic life (as Augustine 
turned out to be), he pursued the same Platonic concerns in his quest to 
find and refine a usable answer to the origin and place of evil in God's 
ordered world. Now at the Vintage Vacation site of Cassiciacum and now 
retired from his life as a rhetor, he sought to work out his educational 
goals for the Christian man or woman who had to deal with the harshness 
of fifth century Roman life and who lived in the cultural climate of 
moira. 
What made for a mature person of God in this type of world? How 
did one attain this life? What were the methods of achieving it? How 
did one see behind the cruel changeableness of life to the changeless, one 
God? What tools could be used from the classical methodology of 
education? And which ones needed to be discarded? 
The simplistic answers of the Manicheans, who cloaked their 
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answers in the rhetoric of their day, didn't satisfy the discerning and 
gifted Augustine. The skeptical responses of the doubters of his day only 
drove him away from God. But the thoughts of the Platonist gave him 
wholeness in a disconnected and crude world. The evidence of their 
influences could be seen in both the Socratic methodology and the 
eventual answers that the retreaters with Augustine arrived at. 
As he reported in The Confessions,' his conversion to Christianity 
was coupled with a rejection of the things of this world. The dismissal of 
his mistress was the first rejection, a resolution not to marry (even 
though he was pledged to another woman) was the second, and the 
teaching of rhetoric at his talk-shop was the last worldly involvement to 
be rejected.' At the same time Augustine suffered from a breathing 
disorder and needed to retreat for health reasons.116 It was in this idyllic 
setting that Augustine wrote many of his formative works that set the 
stage for his later educational philosophy for the Biblical exegete, de 
Doctrines Christiana. 
114 Ibid., Bk. VIII, chap. VI, p. 171. 
115 Ibid., Bk. IX, chap. II, p. 185. 
116 Ibid., Bk. IX, chap. II, p. 186. 
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The Soul (anima) Seeks the One (unum), Immovable God 
Being the wordsmith that he is, Augustine sees in the words unum 
(one) and anima (soul) similarities in meaning and purpose. The Latin 
word for soul comes from the Latin word for one. Should it not be true 
then that the soul seeks to return to the One God, from whom all things 
come? Augustine's famous prayer then doesn't just sound good. It is 
rooted deep within his philosophical way of dealing with the Christian's 
journey to faith. "You [0 Lord] stimulate him to take pleasure in praising 
you, because you have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless 
until they find peace in you."' The senses are incapable of 
understanding; there are only traces of reason in them. It is the soul, 
possessed with the powers of reason and identified with the activities of 
the mind that can see beyond what the senses perceive to be the great 
ordo of God. 
The soul, returned to itself in this manner, 
understands what is the beauty of the universe; this 
term is evidently derived from the word unum (one). 
Wherefore, the beholding of oneness is not granted to 
that soul which wanders toward many objects and 
eagerly pursues mental beggary, which, though it does 
not know it, can only be avoided by keeping aloof from 
117 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 1, p. 12 
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the multitude; and I mean, not just the multitude of 
men, but of all things that the senses reach.118 
It is the soul in the wise person who can carry out the objectives 
of Augustine's educational pursuits--to know God and to know one's self. 
The wise person loves wisdom, philosophy. To philosophy pertains a 
twofold question: the first treats of the soul (Una de anima); the second 
of God (alter de Deo). The first makes us know ourselves (Prima affect 
ut nosmetipsos noverimus) (a directive that was rooted deep in the Greek 
culture as so many of the Greek dramatists point out in their tragedies); 
the second makes us know our origins (alters, ut originem nostram). 1" 
(This God, although one and immovable like Plato's, the Greeks do not 
know.) 
The former is the more delightful to us; the latter is 
more precious. The former makes us fit for a happy 
life (beata vita); the latter renders us happy. The first 
is for beginners (prima est illa discentibus); the latter, 
for the well instructed (ista jam doctis). This is the 
order of wisdom's branches of study (Hic est ordo 
studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quisque idoneus 
ad intelligendum ordinem rerum) by which one 
becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to 
discern two worlds (duo mundos) and the very Author 
11' Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. II, p. 11. 
119 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XVIII, p. 158. 
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the universe .. . (et ipsum parentum universitatis). 
The soul's connection to God is not, as the Manicheans thought, a 
connection of substance (Nihil velint omnino distare). Like all of 
creation the souls of people are distinct from God." Yet Augustine stops 
short of saying how the souls come to be and what is their origin and 
what actually are their powers here below. How far are they subject to 
death? And are they immortal as Plato contends in the tenth book of his 
The Republic because evils can not destroy them?' ". . . if any one 
dares rashly and without due order of the branches of learning to rush 
to the knowing of these things, he becomes, not a man of credibility; not 
a man of discretion, but a man ready to discredit everything."' Like 
the mysteries of the First Principles that God is one, omnipotent and that 
He is tripotent, Father and Son and Holy Spirit,' Augustine leaves the 
deeper understanding of the soul a mystery. 
120 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XVIII, par. XXXXVII, pp. 158-159. 
121 Ibid., p. 187.  
122 Plato., N P.N F, in intro to "To Prove That No One Can Harm The Man Who Does 
Not Injure Himself" by St. Chrysostom, vol IX. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm B. 
Eerdmanns, 1988), p. 270. 
123 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, cap V, par. XVII, p. 103. 
124 Ibid., BK. II, chap. V, par. XVI, p. 101. 
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God, as the Highest Reason to Which the Soul Returns 
Since it is man's reason that gives him the capability to sort 
through and connect the things that the senses feed it, man's reasoning 
powers are most like God. It is the reasoning powers of God that connect 
all things and give it an order. He calls God the over-soul or world-soul, 
although later in his end-of-his-life writings he confesses that he has been 
too rash in accepting this Platonic teaching and that neither reason nor 
faith can prove whether there is an over-soul.' But the notion does 
give greater support to his assumption that the soul longs for and desires 
to return to its source. 
"Now that which is rational in us, that which uses 
reason and either produces or seeks after the things 
that are reasonable--(Namque illud autem nobis est 
rationale, id est quod ratione utitur et rationabilia 
vel facit vel sequitur.) since by a certain natural bond 
it was held fast in the fellowship of those with whom it 
possessed reason as a common heritage, and since men 
could not be most firmly associated unless they 
conversed and thus poured, so to speak, their minds 
and thoughts back and forth to one another--saw that 
names or meaningful sounds, had to be assigned to 
things, so that men might use the sense almost as an 
interpreter to link together, inasmuch as they could 
125 Cf. ibid., Bk. II, chap. XI, par. XXX, p. 131. In the footnote Russell cites 
Augustine there "that he had been rash (temere) in accepting as true something not proved 
either by reason or by faith" p. 186. 
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not hear the present words of those not present.' 
This reasonable God is the God of order, as Licentius states at the 
beginning, who though he governs according to order also is governed by 
order, for it was by order that Christ was sent by God the Father to US.127 
Then in what manner does God govern? He governs in such a way that 
He not only does things by order, but He Himself is governed by order. 
One can see this in nature that is put together in a well-fitting manner or 
in a musical piece that is well harmonized or in the beauty of a dance or 
in a piece of poetry that possesses a balance in the use of poetic 
techniques. These lift the senses beyond themselves to the reasonable 
order behind all things.'" This can be seen everywhere because God is 
everywhere. "Perhaps because God is everywhere, then wheresoever the 
wise man goes, there he finds God with whom he can be. So it follows 
that we can at the same time affirm  that the wise man passes from place 
126 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. XII, par. XXXV, pp. 138-141. 
127 Cf ibid., Bk. I, chap. X, par. XXIX, p. 55. Si igitur Deus Christian ordine ad nos 
misit et Deum Christum esse non negamus non solum agit omnia, sed agitur ordine etiam 
Deus. 
128 Cf ibid., Bk. I, chap. XI, par. 32, & 147; Bk. II. Chap. XIV, par. XL, pp 135. 
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to place- which is `to be moved'-- and yet that he is always with God."' 
This wise man may move from place to place, but because he has a mind 
and a soul he can be connected with the wise God in any place. 
The Just God 
Licentius, defending the position that God established order and is 
governed by order,'3° also stated confidently that "God is absolutely just 
(erat Deus justus)." There was never a time when he wasn't just (Deus 
semperjustus nut) even though there was a time when there was not evil 
(exstitit malum), for evil had a beginning. Where and how this evil 
came from, Augustine didn't say. But it did have a beginning, and God 
had the ability to distinguish evil from good (a bono sejungeret).' "For 
the fact that evil had a beginning is surely not brought about by the 
order of God; but when it had become a fact, it was included in God's 
order."' Evil, then, is not totally in opposition with God but somehow 
is mysteriously included in the order of God as dark colors are included 
129 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. VI, par. IXX, p. 107. 
130 Cf. ibid., Bk. II chap. VII, par. XXII, p. 113. 
131 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. VII, par. XXII, pp. 112-113. 
132 Ibid., pp. 114-115. Ouod enim factum est ut malum nasceretur, non utique Dei 
ordine factum est, sed cum esset natum Dei ordine inclusum est. 
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with bright colors to make a picture. 
The Incarnation and the Platonists 
What sets Augustine apart from the Platonists is his belief that this 
one, immovable God, who is present in all places at the same time, who is 
tripotent, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, came among us for our sake. 
These are part of the mysteries of the Godhead that set Augustine apart 
from the Platonists, from the ingenious men (ingeniosorum superbia).' 
It is the conviction of a true Platonist, like Apuleius of Madaura, that God 
does not mingle with men.' What puzzles the Platonists is the seeming 
contradiction that the One God could dwell among men, that the wholly 
other God, the immovable God, could dwell among that which is 
changeable, that the self-sufficient, good God can come to dwell among 
mankind who is vulnerable to evil. This Augustine assumes is a part of 
revealed truths. 
133 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. V, par. XVI, pp. 100-101 [See footnote 81]. 
134 Ibid., p. 184. In addition to the above-mentioned Platonic assumption, other points 
generally identified with the Platonic school were seen to be incompatible with revealed 
truth and were accordingly repudiated by Augustine. Chief among these errors were the 
following: a) that the world came into being necessarily and by a process of emanation; b) 
the doctrine of the transmigration of souls; c) the eternal duration of the world. 
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The Place of Poetry, Philosophy and Rhetoric 
At the beginning of the discourse when Augustine finds that 
Licentius is awake, Augustine challenges him to think about why the 
waterfall flows intermittently. What he is really asking is for Licentius to 
think about the order of things. Or what causes things to occur in the 
manner that they do? Why do things happen the way they do? He is 
challenging him to search for truth. Augustine says "Quite rightly, 
therefore you were not marveling; and you were musing on Calliope." 
(who is the chief muse of the poets).' Augustine is moved to ask, 
"Whence does marveling arise, or what is the source of this defect but 
something unusual and apart from the evident order of its causes?" The 
question evokes from Licentius a commitment to order. "Apart from the 
evident order, I admit that, but, it seems to me, nothing is done apart 
from order."' Licentius is now moved to study philosophy, for 
philosophy, as he has begun to believe, is man's true and tranquil abode 
(vera et inconcussa nostra habitatio). 
Yet, Augustine doesn't reject everything related to poetry. In 
135 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. III, par. VIII, pp. 18-19. Merito, inquam, to nihil mirabaris 
et apud Calliopam to intus tenebus. 
136 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. HI, par. VIII, p. 19. 
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showing that moderation in poetry is connected to the reasonableness of 
things, he says that the good poets know how to use the right amount of 
solecisms and barbarisms, even though they call them tropes and 
metaplasms. If we remove these from poems, shall we be so delighted? 
"Because order directs and restrains them, it does not suffer them to be 
in excess in their proper place, or to be anywhere out of place. 
Unpretentious and seemingly inelegant diction, interspersed in a 
discourse, brings bolder relief the fancy flights and the ornate 
passages."' 
Like Plato who banned the poets from his ideal republic, Augustine 
is disturbed by his student's interest in poetry because such musings do 
not lead to truth. Only Socratic-like questionings will lead to an 
understanding of the ordering of things. The question at the Cassiciacum 
retreat is, is there, in the face of the cruelities of the Roman world, an 
order to things or not? Now drawn away from his poetry and toward the 
search of truth, Licentius is convinced that there is an order to all things. 
But the popular study of rhetoric doesn't fare much better for 
Augustine. Now having given up his "talking-shop" in Milan, he is able to 
137 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. IV, par. XIII, p. 97. 
79 
put in writing why he gave up the most popular field of study of his day. 
He says that he is sorely vexed while teaching in the school of rhetoric in 
Milan, "because boys were motivated, not by the advantage and beauty of 
learning, but by the love of paltriest praise." (Sed inanissimae laudis 
amore discerentur.)138 ". . . some of them were not even ashamed to 
plagiarize the words of others."' Augustine fears that Licentius and 
Trygetius want to introduce an enfeebling jealousy and empty boasting 
into the philosophical discourse that they are having. These are the very 
things that rhetoric plays upon. The pursuit of philosophy is the pursuit 
of learning and wisdom for their own sakes. In true philosophy there is 
no room for vanity. Augustine confesses that dialectic has the ability to 
teach and to learn because it leads to the embrace of truth. When this is 
shaped into oratory, it is called rhetoric. Augustine describes his 
resignation from his position as teacher of rhetoric in the following 
manner. 
And I decided in your sight that, without making 
any violent gesture, I would gently withdraw from a 
position where I was making use of my tongue in the 
talking-shop, no longer should my young students (who 
138 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. X, par. )00C, p. 59. 
139 Ibid. 
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were not so much interested in your law and your 
peace as in absurd deceptions and legal battles) buy 
from my mouth material for affirming their own 
madness. And luckily it happened that there were only 
a few days more before the Vintage Vacation, and I 
decided to endure them so that I might retire from the 
profession in a regular way. I had been bought by you 
and was not going to return again to put myself up for 
sale. . . . There was also the fact that that summer my 
lungs had begun to give way as the result of overwork 
in teaching. I found it difficult to breathe deeply; pains 
in the chest were evidence of the injury and made it 
impossible for me to speak loudly or for a long time. . 
. . What had helped me in the past to bear my hard 
labor had been the desire to make money. The desire 
had now gone, and if its place had not been taken by 
patience, I should have been quite overwhelmed by 
staying on at my work. Some of your servants, my 
brothers, may say that I sinned in this, because, with 
my heart fully set on your service, I continued to hold 
even for one hour my professorship of lies. But I know 
that you, most merciful Lord, have pardoned and 
remitted this sin too, along with any other terrible and 
deadly sins in the holy water of Baptism. . . . And the 
day came on which I was actually to be freed of this 
profession of rhetoric, from which in my mind I was 
already free. So it was done. You rescued my tongue 
as you had rescued my heart. I rejoiced and blessed 
you and with all my friends went off to the country 
house. My writing was now done in your service, 
through still, in this kind of breathing space, the breath 
it drew was from the school of pride. . . . For till then, 
the Spirit was not yet given, becausejesus was not yet 
glorified. And the prophet cries out, How long, slow of 
heart? Why do ye love vanity and seek after lying? 
He cries out, How long? He cries out, Know this. And 
I so long, not knowing, loved vanity and sought after 
lying. And so I listened and trembled, because these 
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words were spoken to such people as I remembered 
myself to have been. For there was both vanity and 
lying in those phantasms which I had accepted as the 
truth, and now in the grief I felt at the remembrance 
of it I loaded myself with bitter and sincere reproaches. 
I wished that those who still love vanity and seek after 
lying could have heard me.' 
But philosophy seeks the Truth, and this Augustine does in the de 
Ordine. The whole discourse at the Verecundus-owned retreat center is 
set up like a Platonic dialogue. Augustine asks the question of his 
students to stretch their mind about things that their senses cannot 
perceive and only their minds can grasp. He is leading them out of the 
"cave" of life and into the light of Truth; that order is that which will lead 
us to God. The obstacle that remains in the way of grasping this truth 
is all the evil that occurs in life. Where did it come from? Did it have an 
origin? Is it included in the divine order of things? Is it governed or 
does it govern? 
Augustine begins examining the origin of evil in God's good 
creation about twelve years before. Then, he finds what he thinks is the 
answer in the teachings of the Manicheans. They explain evil as a 
material substance and good as that which is spiritual. But evil as a 
14° Augustine, The Confessions. Bk. IX, chap. II- IV, pp. 185-190. 
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substance does not satisfy when one considers the revealed truth of 
Scriptures in Genesis where we read that God created all things good. 
Augustine finds in the classical methodology of education, with a Platonic 
philosophical emphasis, the necessary tool to grasp life on a deeper level 
than what the senses can perceive. 
The Place of Philosophy 
The person, therefore, who has been trained in the liberal arts 
(disciplinarum liberalium) was best equipped to care (curas) for order 
(ordinem). The liberal arts carried with them the notion that they freed 
a man or a woman to be fully a man or a woman, a human being. They 
delivered them from the bondages which the barbarians were subjected 
to. It meant that the person was able to speak, to write, to create, and 
above all to think. Hannah Arendt wrote that the ancient world 
distinguished between "liberal" and "servile arts." She concluded that the 
distinction is not so much that one works with one's brain and the other 
with one's hands, but one made an impact on others through political 
decisions. These political decisions involved occupations embracing 
prudentia, the capacity for prudent judgment which was the virtue of 
statesmen, and professions of public relevance (ad hominum utilitatem) 
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such as architecture, medicine and agriculture.' Both needed the 
training of the liberal arts, but the former pursued its end for its own 
sake, therefore, Arendt ranked these occupations higher. 
Augustine carried his pursuit of the happy life (beata vita) to 
another level. He resigned from his "talking-shop" because the money he 
earned from this occupation was based on the faulty notion of what was 
perceived to be useful in Roman society--the skills of rhetoric to educate, 
to delight, and to persuade. Augustine knew that finding the Truth of 
God's order may not have any usefulness. It could be done for its own 
sake. "In those years I taught the art of rhetoric. Overcome by a desire 
for gain, I took money for speech making. Nevertheless, Lord as you 
know, I preferred to have honest pupils ( as honesty is reckoned 
nowadays); without deceit I taught them the arts of deception, to be used 
not against the life of any innocent man, though sometimes to save the 
life of the guilty."142 In the latter days of the fourth century people 
would pay for such a useful skill. Augustine played with this distinction 
even more in de Doctrina Christiana. 
141 Arendt, pp. 79-80. 
142 Augustine, The Confessions. BK. IV, chap. II, p. 70. 
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If we take Hannah Arendt's distinction as an accurate assessment of 
the goal of liberal arts studies in the ancient Roman world, we will, then, 
read in Augustine's challenge to his students at Cassiciarum a similar 
challenge that they learn to love wisdom for its own sake. This is the 
wise, godly person. This is the philosopher king. This is attained 
through that discipline of disciplines (disciplinam disciplinarum), which 
is called dialectics (quam dialecticam vocant). This science teaches both 
how to teach (docet docere) and how to learn (docet discere). ' "In it, 
reason itself exhibits itself (ratio demonstrat), and reveals its own nature, 
its desires, its powers. It knows what knowledge is; and by itself, it not 
only wishes to make men learned, but also can make them so."1" 
Augustine shapes his philosophical emphasis toward the love of God 
for his own sake. He doesn't use the word "love" (amare) but the word 
"enjoy" (frui). By this he means to enjoy God for his own sake. "'To 
possess God (Deum habere)) is nothing other than to enjoy God (Deo 
frui)."' This is the happy life (vita beata). This is done especially by 
143 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, chap. XIII, par. XXXVIII, pp. 143-145. 
144 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XIII, par. XXXVIII, p. 145. 
143 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. VII, par. XX, p. 109. 
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those who have been trained through the liberal arts (disciplinarum 
liberalium) and challenged to exercise care (curo) for order (ordinem). 
The Latin word curo is key here. Cassell's Latin Dictionary defines 
the word with several meanings: "to care for or to pay attention to or to 
tend.21146 Langenscheidt Pocket Dictionary adds to these definitions, "to 
be solicitous for and to think or.' Augustine's journey toward Truth 
and the enjoyment of God in the face of all the cruelties of Roman life will 
begin with curas, with a deeper awareness of, yea, even a solicitous 
pursuit of, things around his young charges than what the senses 
provide or on the impulses that poetry reflects. At another place 
Augustine uses the word marveling (mirabilis, mirabaris).1" Cassell's 
Latin Dictionary defines mirabilis in the first place as "wonderful" or 
"astonishing" and secondly as "extraordinary" or "unusual".1" 
So philosophy, which has as its goals the knowledge of God and the 
knowledge of one's soul, begins with "wonder" or "astonishment", the 
146 J. R. V. Marchant, ed. Cassell's Latin Dictionary. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls 
Company), p. 147. 
147 Handford, p. 95. 
148 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. I, cap HI, par. VIII, p. 19. 
149 Marchant, p. 346. 
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"extraordinary" or "unusual". These promptings of the soul are best 
done by one who has been trained in the liberal arts. 
If you have a care (curas) for order, I reply, you must 
return to those verses; for instruction in the liberal 
arts (disciplinarum liberlium), if only it is moderate 
and concise, produces devotees more alert and more 
steadfast and better equipped for embracing the truth 
(amplectendae veritati), so that, Licentius, they more 
ardently seek (ardentius appetant) and more 
consistently pursue (constantius insequantur) and in 
the end more lovingly cling (inhaereant postremo 
dulcius) to that which is called the happy life (quae 
vocatur beata vita).150  
One of Augustine's students at Cassiciacum, Alypius, follows 
through and becomes the Catholic church's counterpart to a government 
official. The young lawyer and close friend of Augustine becomes the 
catholic bishop of Tagaste in North Africa and later the Primate of the 
Province of Numidia.' 
Augustine's Mother, Monica 
But Monica, the mother of Augustine, who followed him to Milan 
and now to Cassiciacum and to whose prayers Augustine attributed his 
150 Augustine., de Ordine. Bk. I, chap. VIII, par. XXIV, pp. 46-47.By "those verses" 
one can only assume that what Augustine means here is the liberal arts that aid one in 
caring for the order of things. 
151 Ibid., p
. 
 3. 
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conversion, was now warmly included in the discourse at Cassiciacum. 
And, mother, to the end that these petitions be most 
observantly made, we enjoin the charge upon you, 
through whose prayers I unhesitantly believe and 
proclaim that God has given me this resolve: to prize 
nothing more highly than the finding of truth, to wish 
for, to think of, to love nothing else." (ut inveniendae 
veritati nihil omino praeponem, nihil aliud velim, nihil 
cogitem, nihil amem.)152  
It is this author's contention that Monica is included in the 
Cassiciacum discussion because as far back as Plato, women are allowed to 
participate in the exercises of the Platonic dialectics whereas they are not 
included in the schools of rhetoric.' This shows another shift in 
Augustine's thinking after his conversion. The Confessions tell us that 
Augustine had once fooled his mother by leaving her at an oratory 
dedicated to the memory of St. Cyprian near North African shores when 
he went off to Rome.' The brilliant rhetor, then, does not recognize 
women equal to any man who could use his rhetorical skills "to hate 
152 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. Chap. XX, par. LII, p. 169. 
153 Marrou, p. 105. 
154 Augustine, The Confessions. Bk. V, par. VIII, p. 101. 
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another human being."' Now Augustine doesn't think it odd to include 
his mother in the discussion about divine order. The footnote reads: 
"Throughout the dialogue (de Ordine) as well in the de Beata Vita, 
Augustine pays beautiful tribute to his saintly mother Monica. In the 
latter work, for example, he acknowledges his debt in these touching 
words: 'I believe that through her merit I am all that I an13.31156 Again, 
while the others marvel at his mother's intellectual discernment and 
wisdom, Augustine does not hesitate to suggest that the source of her 
enlightenment is far beyond the acquired learning of the pagan schools: 
"She voiced those things in such a manner that we, wholly unmindful of 
her sex, would feel that some great man was seated among us. Meanwhile 
I became aware, as far as I could, from what source--yes, from how divine 
a source--those things flowed."' 
By including Monica in the discourse, Augustine makes it clear what 
he is doing at the retreat at Cassiciacum. He is conducting a Platonic 
discourse to pursue Truth, but now it is being tempered with the pursuit 
155 Ibid., Bk. I, par. XVIII, p. 37. 
'Augustine, de Ordine. p. 183. 
157 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
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of the knowledge of the God who became incarnated among mankind. 
How Does One Explain Evil? 
Evil is the final obstacle in the pursuit of Truth. It is still an 
obstruction in the quest for the knowledge of God. How can it be 
included in order? Augustine's questions about evil are rooted in the life 
experience of the death of a true friend and Augustine's subsequent 
thoughts of suicide.' How do so many evils come to pass, although God 
is omnipotent and effects nothing evil? For what purpose did God make 
the world, although He is of no need of anything? Did evil begin in a 
point in time? If it always is, is it always under God's control? If evil 
always is, does it follow that the world always was? 
If the world begins in time, how is evil held in check before the 
beginning of time? If there is a time when evil is not under the control 
of God, what suddenly happens that had not happened before? Is there 
any harm that evil could do to God? Augustine concludes that "any 
investigation in these matters which will need to be done concerning 
these and similar matters, is to be made according to order or not at 
158 Augustine, The Confessions. Bk.IV, chap. IV, pp. 73-75, also Bk. IV, chap. VI, 
p. 76 says "I was at the same time thoroughly tired of living and extremely frightened of 
dying." 
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As with Augustine's understanding of the soul, Augustine doesn't 
have complete answers when answering the above questions. But he 
starts with his original premise: nothing happens apart from the order 
constituted by God. Therefore, he concludes that evil had a beginning. 
He doesn't say when it happened or how it came about. Where did it 
come from, especially if God is good? Could he that is good shape and 
frame that which is not good? Augustine concludes "that evil had a 
beginning, is surely not brought about by the order of God; but when it 
had become a fact, it was included in God's order."' 
This inclusion of evil in God's order is key to understanding 
Augustine's thought here. He says it is something like a teacher, who 
teaches grammar before he teaches the alphabet. Every one who deals 
with life according to reason would say there is something wrong. A 
teacher who teaches in this manner doesn't know the natural order of 
things and the negative results to the students that will occur because of 
159 Augustine, de Ordine. Bk. II, chap. XVII, par. VL, pp. 156-159. Ergo de his atque 
hujusmodi rebus, aut ordine illo eruditionis, aut nullo modo quidquam requirendum est. 
160 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. VII, par. XXIII, pp. 112-115. Quod enim facturm est ut 
malum nasceretur, non utique Dei ordine factum est sed cum esset natum Del 
ordine inclusum est. 
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this altered order. But this is an example of how evil works in life. It is 
not the opposite of good; it is the diminishing of the good, for both 
grammar and the alphabet are good in themselves, but when they are 
taught out of order, evil results. Augustine points also to prostitution 
as to how evil fits into God's world. 
What can be mentioned more sordid, more bereft of 
decency or more full of turpitude than prostitutes, 
procurers and other pests of that sort? Remove 
prostitutes from human affairs, and you will unsettle 
everything on account of lusts; place them in the 
position of matrons, and you will dishonor these latter 
by disgrace and ignominy.'" 
He suggests here, although he counters this assertion in a later work, that 
prostitution has some merit. But by itself it is as evil as anything. 
Augustine understands beauty in the same way. What would a 
painting be like if it had only one color or only bright colors? 
This truth is found in poetry, too. Good poetry needs a balance of 
many poetic techniques: solecisms and barbarism or tropes and 
metaplasms. The proper balance of them leads to a beauty of poetry. 
Too much of one poetic technique will lead to an inappropriate 
161 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. IV, par. XII, p. 95. 
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imbalance, but this never occurs in good poetry.162 
God does not love evil, Licentius states. God loves order; and 
because he loves order, evil somehow gets included in the order of things. 
"This thing he loves: to love good things, and not to love evil things--and 
this itself is a thing of magnificent order and of divine arrangement. And 
because this orderly arrangement maintains the harmony of the universe 
by this very contrast [between good and evil], it comes about that the evil 
things [lesser goods) must need be."' 
The question of the presence of evil haunts Augustine all 
throughout his life. With his conversation and development of a Christian 
educational perceptive, Augustine not only comes to believe that the one, 
eternal, unchangeable God became incarnate to rescue mankind but that 
the means of enjoying Him and therefore living the happy life, Beata vita, 
comes through the classical methodology of education with the goal of 
training the students in the dialogue method of finding Truth. The 
liberal arts are essential because they liberate the young from the servile 
life of people who only live by their senses and do not exercise the innate 
162 Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, chap. IV, par. XIII, p. 97. 
163 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. VII, par. XVIII, p. 37. 
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qualities of the soul. An exercised soul, that longs for God, can enjoy God, 
who has a grand design, much like the painter who preconceives a 
painting before he puts the colors down on the canvass. The educational 
process of exercising the soul is as important as finally sensing the divine 
order behind all things. Both are found in de Ordine and both are for 
Augustine necessary in answering why there is a presence of evil in a 
universe that God had originally created as good. 
III 
de Doctrina Christiana 
The Proper Understanding of Scripture 
Leads us to Enjoy the Highest Good, the One God, the Trinity 
About ten years (396) after the Christianae vitae otium and the 
discourse at Cassiciacum, Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, wrote to 
aspiring church leaders, "In all of these books those fearing God and 
made meek in piety seek the will of God.' He was still the philosophical 
ecclesiastical leader, who led toward the Highest Good, but now his search 
164 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. II, chap. IX, p. 42. In his omnibus libris 
timentes Deum et pietate mansueti quaerunt voluntatem Dei. 
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was filled with a much more thorough knowledge of the Christian classic, 
the Scriptures.165 To realize how true this was the student of Augustine 
will only have to note the increased number of Scriptural passages at the 
bottom of the page in a scholarly edition of de Doctrina Christiana as 
opposed to the number of passages found at the bottom of a similar 
edition of de Ordine. But his approach to Scriptures was not like 
Jerome's (now living in his latter years at Bethlehem) after his dream in 
which he was called "more a Ciceronian than a Christian"' and after 
which he vowed not to read any more pagan writers. Neither was 
Augustine's approach like Tertullian's, who condemned the teaching of 
pagan writers by Christians lest the teacher's faith be contaminated. 
Augustine's approach did not reject his classical education. We only 
have to read Book X of The City of God Against Pagans to sense how well 
Augustine knew his classical pagan writers and how freely he was willing 
to make use of them.' Unlike the negative attitude toward the vain 
pursuits of rhetoric which we found in de Ordine, in de Doc-trina 
165 Brown, Augustine of Hippo. pp. 37 & 267. 
1" W. H. Fremantle, N P N F, vol. VI. p. xvii. 
167 Augustine, Concerning The City of God Against the Pagans, trans. by Henry 
Bettenson, intro.by John O'Meara, Bk. X (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 371ff. 
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Christiana we found that he was less critical of rhetoric. It was true that 
many of his friends who were still Manicheans and who didn't 
understand the Christian faith still viewed him as the teacher of rhetoric 
that he once was. 
De Doctrina Christiana, which Peter Brown called "one of the most 
original that Augustine ever wrote,"168 is replete with references to Cicero, 
the master rhetor, and Virgil, the master Roman poet. Augustine's 
compromise is that "every good and true Christian should understand 
that wherever he may find truth, it is the Lord's.3,169 Augustine states 
that the Christian use of pagan authors is like unto the Israelites, who, 
when they fled in haste from slavery in Egypt, took with them the gold 
and silver and clothing for their journey. "But they [the Egyyptians] 
gave their gold, silver, and clothing to the people of God fleeing from 
Egypt not knowing that they yielded those things which they gave 'unto 
obedience of Christ."' Yet, they are of little value compared to the 
168 Brown, p. 264. 
169 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana. Bk. II, chap. XVIII, p. 54. Immo vero 
quisquis bonus verusque Christianus est, Domini sui esse intelligat ubique 
invenerit veritatem, quam confitens. 
17° Ibid., Bk.II, chap. XL, p. 76. 
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truths which are found in Scripture. "The knowledge collected from the 
books of the pagans, although some of it is useful, is also little as 
compared with that derived from the Holy Scriptures."' 
De Doctrina Christiana is divided into four books. In the first 
three we find Augustine leading his aspiring exegetes in an understanding 
of the rules of Scriptural interpretation and in what can be trustworthy 
and true in life about them. In the fourth book, added three years 
before his death (427), he goes back to the use and misuse of rhetoric in 
teaching the truths of Scripture. His main goal in de Doctrina Christiana 
is to train the aspiring Scriptural exegete and ecclesiastical orator in the 
proper rules of Scriptural interpretation and in teaching its truths. 
As it is true in every age, we approach the reading and studying of 
Scripture with philosophical presuppositions. Augustine, as we have 
already noted, is no different. He is influenced by the philosophical 
notions that are embraced and discussed in Milan. He heard them in the 
sermons of his mentor, Ambrose, who corrected the admirers of Plato 
who thought that Plato taught Jeremiah the lessons of the Lord Jesus 
171 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. XLII, p. 78 
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Christi' Augustine agrees with his spiritual mentor and stated that 
Plato received his Christian-like understandings from Jeremiah at the time 
when he traveled up to Jerusalem on his way down to Egypt. Augustine 
was convinced that to believe the reverse was utmost madness.' This 
gave Augustine justification to lean on Plato as he spelled out to his 
aspiring exegetes that the first principle in Scriptural interpretation was 
to enjoy the Highest Good, the Trinity, for his own sake. "This is a great 
and arduous work,' for it means learning the disciplines of the mind 
and the hard practice of virtue to arrive at such a conclusion. 
In Platonic-fashion Augustine assumes that the harder and more 
difficult it is to discover the truth the more the truth is appreciated.' 
This assumption lends itself to an allegorical method of interpretation of 
the Scriptures and to a moralistic approach of discovering God. 
172 Cf. ibid., Bk II, chap. XXVIII, p. 64. 
im Cf ibid. 
174 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. I, p. 7. 
15  Brown, p. 260. 
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Scripture Leads Us to The Enjoyment of God and The Love of Others 
Truth, whether it is the truths of Scripture or the wizardry of 
words that are heard from an orator, is seen as either "things" (res) or 
"signs" (signum) but things are learned by signs. "All doctrine concerns 
either things or signs, but things are learned by signs."' When using 
this principle as applied to God, the Highest Good, Augustine (as he did 
in de Ordine) encourages the use of man's mental powers over against his 
senses, for the senses will lead one to believe in god as the sky or as the 
brightest light in the sky or to think of a god of gods in terms of a bodily 
shape. But if one thinks of God as high above all things, one does not 
limit Him to what the senses perceive. He, then, is one, immutable, 
intelligible and spiritual. Thus God, to those who use their mental 
powers, is that thing ( r es) who is perceived as above all other things. 
Only such a God can be enjoyed for His own sake. 
A sign is that which is used to signify something else, like 
wood, stone, cattle, and so on. . . There are other 
signs whose whole use is signifying like words. . . every 
sign is also a thing for that which is not a thing is 
nothing at all; but not everything is also a sign.. . Some 
16 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. I, chap. II, p. 8. Omnis doctrina vet 
rerum est, vet signorum; sed res per signs discuntur. 
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things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and there 
are others which are to be enjoyed and used. Those 
things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed. Those 
things which are to be used help and, as it were, sustain 
us as we move toward blessedness in order that we gain 
and cling to those things which make us blessed.' 
From this important passage we can sense that Augustine is convinced 
that all of life is moving back toward God from whom all things came. 
The aspiring Scriptural exegete will get a head start on this journey back 
to God, the Highest God, if he masters the difficult art of knowing the 
difference between the sign (signum) and the thing (res). It's the way 
out of the darkness that hangs over the whole world because of sin. "For 
the Fall had been, among many other things, a fall from direct knowledge 
into indirect knowledge through signs. . . the knowledge by 'signs', with 
flashes of direct awareness."' Only an exercise of one's mental powers, 
coupled with a cleansing by virtue, will lead one to the source of all 
things: the Trinity. This ability to see things behind the signs, Augustine 
later says, liberates a man and aids in the journey back to God; whereas 
the one who worships a significant thing without knowing what it signifies 
177 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. H-III, pp. 8-9 
178 Brown, p. 261. 
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is a slave.'" 
But to grasp God takes pure mental powers and moral purity. He 
is enjoyed for His own sake, for there is nothing higher than He. 
Therefore, he cannot be used to gain something higher. 
The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit, a single Trinity, a certain 
supreme thing common to all who enjoy it, it indeed, 
it is a thing and not rather the cause of all things, or 
both a thing and a cause.' 
The Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ increases our faith for him 
whom we have never seen with our eyes. "He came to a place that he 
already was."' Man does not know him because they are made 
conformable to the world by their senses.182 
In order to see and to believe the God above all gods, the mind 
needs to be cleansed "so that it is able to see that light and to cling to it 
179 Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. III, chap. IX, p. 86. 
178 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. V, p. 10. Res igitur quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et 
spiritus sanctus est, eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res 
communisque omnibus fruentibus ea, si tamen res et non omnium rerum 
causa sit, si tamen et caussa. 
181 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. XII, p. 14. 
182 Cf ibid. 
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once it is seen.'183 Here Scripture helps. In fact the key to understanding 
Scripture, for Augustine, is the two commandments found in Scripture: 
Thou shalt love, He said, the Lord thy God with the 
whole heart, and with the whole soul, and with the 
whole mind and Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself On these commandments hang all the Law and 
the Prophets.' 
Acts of charity, especially the act of charity toward one's enemies, 
is an indication that the person is on a journey back to God. "I call 
`charity' the motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for his own 
sake, the enjoyment of God; but 'cupidity' is a motion of the soul toward 
the enjoyment of one's self."' All of Scripture points to this, and if the 
aspiring exegete does not read this in the Scriptures, he reads and 
interprets them wrongly. 
It is on the basis of this central principle of interpretation that 
Augustine distinguishes between which passages should be read 
I" Ibid., Bk. I, chap. X, p. 13. 
Im Ibid. Bk. I, chap. XXVI, pp. 22-23. Diliges, inquit, Dominum Deum tuum ex toto 
corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, et ex tota mente tua; et dihges proximum tuum tamquam 
to ipsum. In his duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae, Matt. 22:37-38. 
185 Ibid. Bk. III, chap. X, p. 88.Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter 
ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad fruendum 
et proximo et quolibet copore non propter Deum. 
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figuratively and which ones are to be read literally. Whatever passage 
doesn't pertain to virtuous behavior or to charity is to be taken 
figuratively. Augustine's approach to the study and the teaching of 
Scripture ends up to be rather simplistic for any reader of the Scriptures 
in the twentieth century: "Scripture teaches nothing but charity.)3186 
Scriptures Expose Our Love of Temporal Things 
"There is no need for a precept that any one should love 
himself."' The love of self is embedded in the laws of nature. From the 
man who loves his wife for only sexual pleasures and not for 
procreation' to the man who is puffed up with pride when he 
approaches Scripture,'" love of self needs no encouragements. "Thus the 
proud man or the proud angel places his enjoyment in himself and 
rejoices that others place their hopes in him also."' Scriptures will 
reveal unto the reader his love of temporal things. ". . . the student first 
will discover in the Scriptures that he has been enmeshed in the love of 
186 Ibid. Non autem praecipit scriptura nisi caritatem. 
1" Ibid., Bk. I, cap XXXV, p. 30. 
188 Cf. ibid., Bk. III, chap. XIX, p. 96. 
189 Cf ibid., in Robertson's intro., p. 5. 
190 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. XXXIII, p. 28 
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the world, or of temporal things, a love far remote from the kind of love 
of God and of our neighbor which Scripture itself prescribes."19' 
Faith Will Stagger If the Authority of Scriptures Staggers 
De Doctrines Christiana makes clear that the difference between the 
Platonist and the Christian is not so much "the Word made flesh"' but 
the authority of Scriptures. These canonical books, that have been 
selected by the largest number of catholic churches,'" bear an authority 
that no pagan book can claim. One's faith relationship to these Scriptural 
books is a direct outcome on how the churchman does acts of charity. If 
the aspiring exegete has another interpretation of passages from 
Scripture other than that which leads him to love God and love neighbor, 
he will end up being angry at Scripture.' Or if he doubts Scripture, his 
faith will stagger. "If faith staggers, charity itself languishes." Porro fide 
titubante caritas etiam ipso languescit.195 
It is quotes like these that lead D. W. Robertson, Jr. to write in the 
191  Ibid., Bk. II, chap. VII, p. 39. 
192 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. XIII, p. 14. 
193 Cf. ibid., Bk. II, chap. VIII, p. 41 
194 Cf ibid., Bk. I, chap. XXXVII, p. 31. 
195 Ibid. 
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introduction of his de Doctrines Christiana that what sets Augustine 
apart from the ancient classical world was an introduction of charity 
(charitas). "Underlying the specific techniques of both interpretation and 
exposition of Scripture the principle of first importance in St. Augustine's 
mind is charity. The introduction and spread of this specifically Christian 
doctrine marks the decisive break between antiquity and the Middle 
Ages."196  But it is a charity that is supported by a faith in Scriptures. If 
faith in Scripture fails, charity fails. It is the movement toward God, the 
highest good, and in loving Him one loves one's neighbor. 
The More Difficult the Passage the Greater the Appreciation 
Yet, retaining the philosophical approach to Scriptures, Augustine 
seeks to find in Scriptures hidden truths, much like when he found in the 
order of things at Cassiciacum a meaning to life beyond what the senses 
could give. Then, he used the Platonic dialogue method, now he discards 
that method in favor of the lecture method. He acts as a bishop who 
makes authoritative pronouncements to the aspiring young exegetes. 
For Augustine the Jewish people do not know how to do this. They are 
196 Ibid., 
 p. X. 
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subject to temporal things and in such a way the One God is served.19' 
This principle holds true in the understanding of places like the 
pool of Siloe, where the Lord commanded the man whose eyes he anoints 
with clay made of spittle to wash. This Augustine suggests could mean 
some form of mystery, I. e., baptism.'" This also holds true in 
understanding a serpent. It exposes its whole body in order to protect its 
head from those attacking it. This illustrates the sense of the Lord's 
admonition that we are to be as serpents. 
That is, for the sake of our head, which is Christ, we 
should offer our bodies to persecutors lest the 
Christian faith be in a manner killed in us, and in an 
effort to save our bodies we deny God. It is also said 
that the serpent, having forced its way through narrow 
openings sheds its skin and renews its vigor. How well 
this conforms to our imitation of the wisdom of the 
serpent when we shed the "old man," as the Apostle 
says, and put on the "new"; and we shed it in narrow 
places, for the Lord directs us, "Enter ye in at the 
narrow gate.'" 
197 Cf ibid. Bk. III, chap. VI, p. 84. 
198 Ibid. Bk. II, chap. XVI, p. 50 
199 Ibid., Bk.II, chap. XVI, pp. 50-51. 
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A Sign Causes us to Think of Something Beyond 
This interpretation sounds strange and unbecoming to our ears, it 
would not have irritated Augustine's philosophical leanings. The 
allegorical method of interpretation fits his way of finding the truth 
behind the events of life as well as fits the manner in which Scripture 
becomes for him that which held the Truth behind the words, events, and 
characters. 
. . . A sign is a thing which causes us to think of 
something beyond the impression the thing itself 
makes upon our senses. Thus if we see a track, we 
think of the animal that made the track; if we see 
smoke, we know that there is a fire which causes it; if 
we hear the voice of a living being, we attend to the 
emotion it expresses; and when a trumpet sounds, a 
soldier should know whether it is necessary to advance 
or to retreat, or whether the battle demands some 
other response.' 
Augustine says numbers found in the Scriptures should be 
understood with intelligence. After working through his Scriptural 
numbers, we still wonder what he has in mind. But, as Peter Brown 
Ibid., Bk. II, chap. I, p. 34. . . . Sign um est enim res praeter speciem, quam 
ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire: sicut 
vestigio viso transisse animal, cuius vestigium est, cogitamus, et fumo viso 
ignem subesse cognoscimus, et voce animantis aufita adfectionem animi eius 
advertimus et tuba sonante milites vel progredi se, vel regredi, et si quid 
aliud pugna postulat, oportere noverunt. 
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points out, different numbers are important to the educated pagan man. 
The number nine, which is not one of the major numbers dealt with in 
the Scriptures, is important in the Roman world. It is the number of 
Muses that inspire the poets. Every educated Roman from childhood 
knows this.' Augustine argues, "We must not listen to the superstition 
of the pagans who profess that the nine Muses are the daughters of Jove 
and Memory. They are refuted by the historian Varro, . . . I know of no 
one more eager and learned in such matters."202 Augustine relates what 
Varro told about a certain city that contracted three sculptors to do 
three statues of the Muses. The best three would be placed in the temple 
of Apollo. The city leaders find that each set of three Muses is beautiful, 
and all nine figures please the city leaders. And all of them are bought 
and dedicated in the temple. The poet Hesiod names all nine of them, 
preserving the superstition of the number nine. 
Augustine points out to his aspiring church leaders that the number 
three is embedded in nature, for the city does not come upon the number 
three because any one has seen three Muses in a dream, 
201 Brown., p. 269. 
2°2 Augustine, de Doctrina Christiana. Bk. II, chap. XVII, p. 53. 
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but (as Varro says) because it is easy to see that all 
sound which furnishes material for songs is of a 
threefold nature. It is either produced by the voice, 
like the sound made by those who sing from the throat 
without instrumental accompaniment, by the breath, 
like the sound made by trumpets and flutes, or by 
striking, like the sound produced by harps, drums, or 
other percussion instruments.' 
Augustine, by quoting Varro, is trying to come up with what he thought 
is a scientific explanation or scholarly support of why there are three 
Muses, stripping the Roman world of superstition connected with the 
number nine, a non-Biblical number. 
Augustine counters the number nine with the Scriptural number 
of ten, which, of course, is the number of the commandments as well as 
the number of plagues Moses delivers unto the Egyptians. But Augustine 
sees the number ten in many more Scriptural references. 
. . . Again the number ten signifies a knowledge of the 
Creator and the creature; for the trinity is the Creator 
and the septenary indicates the creature by reason of 
his life and body. For with reference to life there are 
three, whence we should love God with all our hearts, 
with all our souls, and with all our minds; and with 
reference to the body there are obviously four 
elements of which it is made.' 
203 Ibid. Bk. H, chap. XVII, pp. 53-54. 
204 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XVI, p. 52. 
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As twentieth--century Scriptural readers, have we, by reading this 
passage from Augustine, gotten any closer to understanding the number 
ten in Scripture? We do not think so, but this would not have been true 
for Augustine. His point here wasn't a deeper understanding of the 
number ten. His point was that he had replaced the Roman number nine 
with a more Scriptural number, the number ten. The fact that his 
explanation of the number ten was obscure would not have bothered him, 
for he was convinced that an obscure meaning brought one closer to 
God. He argued in order to strip the Roman world of its superstitions and 
led it to the authority of philosophical thinking and Scripture. The 
aspiring exegetical mind that has been exercised to think in this manner 
has drawn closer to God. He has also been led to think more 
scientifically, less fatalistically. After Augustine, Moira or eventus will not 
have as tight a grip on the Roman world as it once had. 
Things of music, too, may halt and impede the reader. Music was 
used at the Roman theater to arouse the emotions of the audience as 
they celebrated the immorality of the gods. But, since musical 
instruments were used in Scripture, anything that the aspiring exegete 
can learn from the world of music that could used to understand 
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Scripture, in fact, should be used.' 
Wherever the Christian Found Truth, It Was the Lord's 
Augustine's principle for determining what the Scriptural exegete 
could use and what he should discard was determined by what he found 
to be true, for "wherever he [the Roman] may find truth (veritatem) it 
is the Lord's." The pagan Roman, ensnared in his supersititions, thought 
he had truth, but it was a truth that preempted the Truth of God. For 
Augustine the pagan Roman wasn't filled with the love and enjoyment of 
the One, immutable God for his own sake nor filled with enough 
charitable acts toward his neighbor. He was filled too much with 
wretched pagan superstitions. 
The Study of Astrology Was Rooted in Fate-filled Notions 
Many of these superstitions centered around astrology, especially 
the ones called genethliaci, which has to do with birthdays, or commonly, 
mathematici [judicial astrologers]. Augustine's criticism ran deep. 
Although these men may seek out and even find the 
exact position of the stars at the time someone is born, 
yet when they seek to predict on that basis either our 
actions or the outcome of our actions they err greatly 
and sell unlearned men into a miserable servitude. For 
zos Cf. ibid., Bk. II, chap. XVII p. 54. 
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a man who is free when he goes to such an astrologer 
gives his money that he may leave him as the servant 
either of Mars or of Venus, or rather of all the stars to 
which those who first erred in this way and passed 
their error on to posterity gave names of beasts 
because of the resemblances or names of men in an 
effort to honor men. . . . To desire to predict at birth, 
on the basis of such observations, the habits, actions, 
and fortunes of men is a great error and a great 
madness."' 
Augustine refuted these astrological superstitions by pointing out 
that all these predictions are based on the opinion of wretched men. And 
secondly, these predictions can be disproven by the observation of what 
happened to the Scriptural twins, Jacob and Esau. 
Thus we know that Esau and Jacob were born twins in 
such a way that Jacob, who was born last, was found 
holding with his hand the foot of his brother who went 
before. Certainly, the day and hour of birth for these 
two could not be otherwise noted except in such a way 
that the constellation for both should be the same. Yet 
what a difference there was in the manners, deeds, 
labors, and fortunes of these two men the Scriptures, 
now accessible to all men, testifies.2°7  
Augustine's felt that such superstitions led to useless falsehoods and 
reflect "pacts and contracts with demons."' Evidence of "pacts and 
206 Ibid. Bk. H, chap. XXI, p. 56. 
207 Ibid., 
 p. 
58.  
208 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXII, par. 34, p. 58. 
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contracts with demons" was that people who predict the future of an 
individual based on the stars seldom agree. Augustine suggested that 
when men agreed among themselves a practice or an institution became 
useful. "For all practices which have value among men because men agree 
among themselves that they are valuable as human institutions . . .3)209 
But the useful and necessary institutions established by 
men with men include whatever they have agreed upon 
concerning differences of dress and the adornment of 
the person useful for distinguishing sex or rank, and 
innumerable kinds of signs without which human 
society could not or could not easily function, including 
weights and measures, differences of value and 
impression in coinage appropriate to specific states and 
peoples, and other things of this kind. . . . But all this 
part of human institutions helpful to the necessary 
conduct of life is not to be shunned by the Christian; 
rather, as such institutions are needed, they are to be 
given sufficient notice and remembered.' 
Therefore, instead of turning to Julius Caesar, who was said to have 
had his many fortunes in life because he was born at the time of the 
appearance of a comet, Augustine lifted up these two Biblical characters 
to refute the very deep notions of fate (moira) in Roman culture. Jacob 
and Esau were not governed by a common fate. And finally, he refuted 
209 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXV, par. 38, p. 61. 
21° Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXV, pars. 39-40, p. 62. 
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the practice of astrology by pointing out that no two interpretations 
agreed. 
Moreover, they imply a pestiferous curiosity, an 
excruciating solicitude, and a mortal slavery. They 
were not noticed because of any innate validity, but 
they were made to have validity through being noticed 
and pointed out. Thus they seemed different to 
different people in accordance with their thoughts and 
presumptions."' 
One thing meant one thing among the Romans and another thing 
among the Greeks. "Therefore, just as all of these significations move 
men's minds in accordance with the consent of their societies and because 
this consent varies, they move them differently, nor do men agree upon 
them because of an innate value, but they have a value because they are 
agreed upon./3212 
Yet, Augustine encouraged the scientific study of astronomy. If one 
knew the present position of the stars, it was possible to trace their past 
courses according to a rule. Therefore, one can predict the future 
according to the same rule. This was not superstitious and portentous 
but certain and fixed by calculation. There was no lesson for life here. 
211 Ibid. Bk. II, chap. XXIV, p. 60. 
212 Ibid. Bk. II, chap. XXIV, p. 60-61. 
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"We do not seek to learn here any application of our deeds and fates in 
the manner of the ravings of the astrologers but only information that 
pertains to the stars themselves."' 
Augustine's criticism of astrology went deeper. It was based on 
astrology's violation of the first commandment. Astrology named 
constellations and planets, which originally had no names, after men and 
gods and overlooked the God who created the stars and ordered them.' 
But his criticism was also based on science. Astrology failed to see the 
order that God has placed in the motion of the stars; and therefore, 
Roman pagan culture, by clinging to such superstitious notions, had kept 
the Roman world from truth. 
Truth of an Institution Depended upon Common Agreement 
How can one tell whether a custom or an institution can be trusted 
or not? Here Augustine sounded strikingly modern. Like astrology and 
other superstitions which produced a variety of interpretations so 
Augustine was against variety in institutional practices. These came from 
the devil. These were to be eradicated from the Christian's mind. It was 
213 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXIX, p. 66. 
214 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXI, p. 56. 
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a common agreement of men, like the rule of the majority, that made a 
practice, custom, or institution trustworthy or not. "Some of these are 
superfluous and extravagant, others useful and necessary."' He was 
especially critical of the variety of ways in which signs were interpreted. 
These were not valid except by common consent. (Nisi consensus 
accedat)"6 
But the useful and necessary institutions established by 
men with men include whatever they have agreed upon 
concerning differences of dress and the adornment of 
the person useful for distinguishing sex or rank, and 
innumerable kinds of signs without which human 
society could not or could not [sic] easily function, 
including weights and measures, differences of value 
and impression in coinage appropriate to specific states 
and peoples, and other things of this kind. . . . But all 
this of human institutions helpful to the necessary 
conduct of life is not to be shunned by the Christian; 
rather, as such institutions are needed, they are to be 
given sufficient notice and remembered.' 
215 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXV, p. 61. Quorum partim superflua luxuriosaque 
instituta sunt, partim commoda et necessaria. 
216 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXXI, p. 68. 
217 Ibid,. Bk. II, chap. XXV, p. 62. Sed haec tota pars humanorum institutorum, 
quae ad usum vitae necessarium proticiunt, nequaquam est fugienda Christiano, 
immo etiam quantum satis est intuenda memoriaque retinenda. 
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Logical Truth Was Found in Scriptures 
Augustine saw a similar logic embedded in the Scriptures. Or he 
seemed to be saying, "the Scriptures themselves are logical." 
CC 
. . . the truth of propositions is a matter to be discovered in sacred 
books 1,218 Augustine drew upon the writings of St. Paul in the 15th 
chapter of 1 Corinthians to show how false inferences can be drawn from 
a true proposition. The true proposition was that Christ was raised from 
the dead; the false inference is that the dead shall not rise. Sometimes 
it did happen that true inferences can come from false premises. 
"However, the truth of valid inference was not instituted by men; rather 
it was observed by men and set down that they might learn or teach 
it."' Drawing from the same premise as in de Ordine, Augustine wrote 
in de Doctrina Christiana, that ". . .it is perpetually instituted by God in 
the reasonable order of things. Thus the person who narrated the order 
of events in time did not compose that order himself . . . .”220 When a 
consequent was false, it was necessary that the antecedent upon which it 
218 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXXI, p. 68. 
219 Ibid., Bk. H, chap. XXXII, p. 68. 
220 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. XXXII. 
117 
was based be false also. This can be found in St. Paul's defense of the 
resurrection of the dead in I Corinthians 15. 
Those whose error the Apostle wished to refute had set 
forth the antecedent that there is no resurrection of 
the dead. But the consequent follows from this 
antecedent that there is no resurrection of the dead 
that "then Christ is not risen," but this consequent is 
false. For Christ arose, so that the antecedent is false 
that there is no resurrection of the dead. It follows 
that there is a resurrrection of the dead. This may be 
put briefly as follows: "If there is no resurrection of 
the dead, neither was Christ resurrected. But Christ 
was resurrected. Therefore there is a resurrection of 
the dead." The principle that if the consequent is false 
the antecedent must also be false was not instituted by 
men, but discovered. And this rule applies to the 
validity of inferences, not to the truth of 
propositions."' 
Knowledge of Scriptural Languages Aided the Discovery of Truth 
Even though Augustine was said to have been a "poor" Greek 
student in his school days, he encouraged the aspiring Scriptural exegete 
to be proficient in the Scriptural languages. ". . . he will become the only 
Latin philosopher in antiquity to be virtually ignorant of Greek."' 
However, a thorough knowledge of Greek could have helped Augustine to 
explain unknown words and locutions. He would have been closer to an 
m Ibid., Bk. H, chap. XXXII, pp. 68-69. 
222 Brown, p. 36. 
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understanding of the original text and would have been able to explain 
the ambiguities of the Scriptures, as in the following passage in which 
Augustine did reflect some knowledge of the Greek language. 
Not only ambiguities of this type but also those which 
do not depend on punctuation or pronunciation should 
be treated in the same way. Consider the passage from 
Thessalonians: "Therefore we were comforted, 
brethren, in you." (I Thess. 3:7) It is doubtful whether 
"brethren" [Latin, frcrtres] should be read as a vocative 
[as in the translation above] or as an accusative [so as 
to read aon this account we have comforted the 
brethren among you"]. But in Greek the two cases do 
not have the same form, and when the Greek text is 
examined, the word is found to be vocative. But if the 
translator had been willing to say, Propterea, 
consolationem habuimus, fratres, in vobis [instead of 
consolati sumus], the translation would have been 
literal but also less doubtful as to meaning.' 
Knowing the original Scriptural languages, the aspiring exegete will 
know more accurately whether the Scriptural words were to be taken 
figuratively or literally.224 This was an important skill to master for 
Augustine because not to know the difference between the literal and the 
figurative was to fail to demonstrate what distinguishes a man from a 
beast, which is understanding. When man was subjected to the "flesh" of 
223 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. III, chap. IV, p. 83. 
224 Cf. ibid., Bk. III, chap. I, pp. 78-79. 
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a word, Augustine assumed that he is less than a man. 
For example , if he hears of the Sabbath, he thinks only 
of one day out of the seven that are repeated in a 
continuous cycle; and if he hears of Sacrifice, his 
thoughts do not go beyond the customary victims of 
the flocks and fruits of the earth. There is a miserable 
servitude of the spirit in his habit of taking signs for 
things, so that one is not able to raise the eye of the 
mind above things that are corporeal and created to 
drink in eternal light.' 
Rhetoric Can Be Used in Service of Truth 
In the fourth book of de Doctrines Christiana Augustine returned 
to the subject by which he once earned a living, the art of rhetoric. This 
time he handled it in a more balanced way than in de Ordine. Now he saw 
some usefulness in it for the aspiring Scriptural exegete. After all, its 
skills, which were "to learn the art of words, to acquire that eloquence 
that was essential to persuade men of your case, to unroll your opinions 
before them,"' were being acquired and practiced in schools of rhetoric 
throughout the Roman Empire in Augustine's day from Bordeaux to 
225 Ibid., Bk. III, chap. V, p. 84. 
226 Brown, p. 36. Brown is here quoting from Augustine's The Confessions. Bk. I, chap. 
XVI. 
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Antioch.' Being educated to be a complete Roman and being practiced 
in the art of rhetoric, he knew its power and effect on people when used 
as a teaching tool and realized that its first task was to teach before it 
could be used to delight and persuade. The aspiring exegete would have 
to teach the Scriptural truths he discovered, and he would have to do it 
in a delightful and persuasive manner. What he didn't like about the art 
of rhetoric was its natural inclination to puff up the one using it and 
even the one hearing it into thinking that the mere eloquence of words 
made the words true. They "place their own language above the language 
of our authors, not because of its greatness but because of its vanity."' 
This was "often extremely injurious and profits no one."' "For a man 
speaks more or less wisely to the extent that he has become more or less 
proficient in the Holy Scriptures."230 
227 Cf. ibid. 
228 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Bk. IV, chap. VI, p. 124. 
229 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. V, p. 121. Augustine quotes Cicero's de Invent. Bk.I, chap. I, 
par. I. 
2" Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. V, p. 122. 
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Rhetoric Should Not Be Taught Per Se 
Augustine argued that if rhetoric can be used in either urging evil 
or justice, why should it not be used for good in the service of truth? 
Augustine's balanced approach to the use of rhetoric was based on the 
fact that rhetorically crafted speeches were heard in all public places 
throughout the Roman Empire. The Christian orator would naturally 
imitate them anyway. Yet, Augustine did not want the rules of rhetoric to 
be taught in his Christian schools, for the same reason that he once gave 
up the teaching of rhetoric years before--because it led to the pursuit of 
vain glory. 
But first in these preliminary remarks I must thwart 
the expectation of those readers who think that I shall 
give rules of rhetoric (rhetorica daturum) here which 
I learned and taught in the secular schools (scholis 
saecularibus). And I admonish them not to expect 
such rules from me, not that they have no utility 
(utilitatis), but because, if they have any, it should be 
sought elsewhere if perhaps some good (bono) man has 
opportunity to learn (discere) them. But he should 
not expect these rules from me, either in this work or 
in any other."' 
231 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. I, p. 118. 
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The Ecclesiastical Orator Was Unaware of His Eloquence 
Augustine was convinced that the rules of eloquence should not be 
taught overtly, but they should be learned by reading and by hearing, by 
imitation. The ecclesiastical orator will have learned eloquence if he 
practiced writing, dictating, or speaking according to the rule of piety 
and faith. Even those who have learned these rules and spoke fluently 
and eloquently cannot be aware of the fact that they were applying them 
while they were speaking unless they were discussing the rules themselves. 
Why can't men learn expressions of eloquence through imitation 
(imitando) rather than following rules of eloquence?' Learning by 
imitation wasn't anything new. The Greek tragic poets used it in their 
presentation of the tragic hero. The Greek hero was an imitator of an 
action, and the audience, as least in terms of emotions, imitated and 
identified with the hero, through his rise and fall. The audience's 
identification with the hero led to a keener sense of self-awareness and 
brought about a catharsis in the emotions of pity and fear.' 
232 Cf. ibid., Bk. N, chap. III, pp. 119-120. 
233 Aristotle, Poetics. 1449, ch. 6, trans. by Ingram Baywater, Introduction to Aristotle. 
ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), p. 631. 
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Scriptural Rhetoric Did Not Abandon Wisdom 
Augustine's wise man was not so much schooled in the rules of 
eloquence but in the truths of the Scriptures, for Scriptures themselves 
abounded in examples of rhetoric. Augustine saw in St. Paul's passage in 
Romans 5:3-5 an example of gradatio, "where words or meanings are 
connected by proceeding one from the other."234  "But we glory also in 
tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience 
trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not because the charity of 
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us." 
Within this passage we also found what the Latin rhetorians call membra 
(portion of anything) or caesa (short sentences). Augustine called a 
group of membrae a circuitus or a going around in a circle. This, too, is 
found in this passage. "But just as we do not say that the Apostle 
followed the precepts of eloquence, so also we do not deny that his 
wisdom was accompanied by eloquence."235 Augustine said the same 
rhetorical devises can be found in St. Paul's second letter to the 
Corinthians, 11:16-30. Sensing in true Platonic fashion that the 
234 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine.Bk. IV, chap. VII, pp. 124-125. 
235 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. VII, p. 125. 
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prophetic writings of the Old Testament were obscured by many tropes 
or figurative words, Augustine knew that the prophetic words became 
sweeter when the aspiring exegete explained them. He found in Amos 
6:1-6 an example of a Scriptural writer, who while retaining the Wisdom 
that Augustine was looking for, did not abandon the use of eloquence:' 
'Woe to you that are wealthy in Sion, and to you that 
have confidence in the mountain of Samaria: ye great 
men, heads of the people, that go in with the state into 
the house of Israel. Pass ye over to Chalane, and see, 
and go from thence into Emath the great: and go down 
into Geth of the Philistines, and to all the best 
kingdoms of these: if their border be larger than your 
border. You that are separated unto the evil day; and 
that approach to the throne of iniquity; You that sleep 
upon beds of ivory, and are wanton on your couches: 
that eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out 
of the midst of the herd; You that sing to the sound of 
the psaltery; they have thought themselves to have 
instruments of music like David; That drink wine in 
bowls, and anoint themselves with best ointments: and 
they are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph."' 
Augustine saw in this passage, which he took from Jerome's Latin 
translation rather than the usual Greek Septuagint, six membra formed 
by three circuitus, starting with the repeating of "you's". The eloquence 
in this passage can not be sensed so much by reading this passage silently 
236 Cf. ibid., Bk. IV, chap. VII, p. 129. 
237 Ibid., p. 129. Augustine quotes directly from Amos 6:1-6. 
125 
as by hearing this series of "you's" read orally. The change and 
softening of the voice would come with the reading of "you that sing to 
the sound of the psaltery", 238 for the prophet was not speaking to the 
people but for the people. "A good listener warms to these words not so 
much by diligently analyzing them but by hearing them pronounced 
energetically."239 
Therefore let us say that our canonical authors and 
teachers were not only wise but eloquent in that kind 
of eloquence which is appropriate for such persons.. . 
. we [the aspiring Christian orator] must imitate them 
in that which they have spoken with a useful and 
healthful obscurity for the purpose of exercising and 
sharpening, as it were, the minds of the readers and of 
destroying fastidiousness and stimulating the desire to 
learn, canceling their intention in such a way that the 
minds of the impious are either converted to piety or 
excluded from the mysteries of the faith.' 
238 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. VII, p.131. 
' Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. VII, p. 132. 
240 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. VII-VIII, p. 132. 
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Augustine Used Cicero's Three-pronged Approach to Rhetoric 
Using Cicero's three pronged use of rhetoric (to teach is a necessity, 
to please is sweetness, to persuade is wisdom), Augustine encouraged the 
Christian orator to communicate in such a fashion that he was 
understood. Often this was determined not so much by what was said as 
by the manner in which it was said. To teach was of first importance to 
the Christian orator, but to retain the interests of the listeners an orator 
must learn the art of delighting. Yet the highest form of eloquence was 
the art of persuasion, for persuasion was victory. People may be taught 
and pleased and still not consent. A listener, however, was to be 
persuaded 
. . . if he loves what you promise, fears what you 
threaten, hates what you condemn, embraces what you 
commend, sorrows at what you maintain is to be 
sorrowful; rejoices when you announce something 
delightful, takes pity on those whom you place before 
him in speaking as being pitiful, flees those whom you, 
moving fear, warn are to be avoided; and is moved by 
whatever else may be done through grand eloquence 
toward moving the minds of listeners, not that they 
may know what is to be done, but that they may do 
what they already know should be done.' 
Such an orator would move people best if he lived what he spoke. 
241 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XII, pp. 136-137. 
127 
But when that which is taught must be put into 
practice and is taught for that reason, the truth of 
what is said is acknowledged in vain and the eloquence 
of the discourse pleases in vain unless that which is 
learned is implemented in action. It is necessary 
therefore for the ecclesiastical orator, when he urges 
that something be done, not only to teach that he may 
instruct and to please that he may hold attention, but 
also to persuade that he may be victorious.' 
just as what we found Augustine saying about poetry in de Ordine, 
that poetic devices ought to be done in moderation, we found him urging 
that any one rhetorical device should not be used in excess. When 
oratory was spoken with "too much profusion it is displeasing."2' Rather 
the Christian orator ought to accomplish more through the piety of his 
prayers than through the skill of his oratory, "so that, praying for himself 
and for those whom he is to address, he is a petitioner before he is a 
speaker. 2" "For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father 
that speaketh in you." (Matthew 10:20) "He who sought to teach in 
speech what was good, spurning none of the three principles of rhetoric, 
242 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XIII, p. 138. 
243 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XIV, p. 139. 
244 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XV, p. 140. 
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should pray and strive that he be heard intelligently, willingly, and 
obediently. When he does this well and properly, he can justly be called 
eloquent,. . .))245 
Augustine Used Cicero's Concern That Oratory Should Vary 
Turning to the master Roman orator Cicero again, Augustine urged 
that oratory should vary according to the subject: small things in a 
subdued manner, moderate things in a temperate manner, and grand 
things in a grand manner. Augustine knew that the ecclesiastical orator 
has a grand subject, because it dealt with man's eternal welfare, and 
therefore, we would think that he would urge that this subject would be 
delivered in a grand manner, but he urged that the grand subject of 
man's salvation should be delivered in a subdued manner. Nevertheless, 
although our teacher should speak of great things, he should not always 
speak about them in a grand manner, but in a subdued manner when he 
taught. 
Yet, within Scripture, there are found all three styles. In Matthew 
25 where the Christian is urged to share a cup of water with another, 
this is to be spoken in a subdued manner, because a cup of cold water is 
245 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XVII, p. 142. 
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a small and most insignificant thing. The promise attached to it is also 
small and insignificant, too.'" Augustine sees in the twelfth chapter of 
Romans a moderate style, because almost all of it is exhortation. "I 
beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present 
your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God."' (Romans 12: 1) 
And later in the same chapter he writes, "Rejoice with them that rejoice; 
weep with them that weep." And in the mighty eighth chapter of Romans, 
he speaks in a grand style when he speaks so convincingly of the love of 
God in Christ. "For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor 
principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor 
might, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to 
separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." 
(Romans 8:38-39)248 
Variety in oral presentation is what Augustine urged for the 
Christian orator. "When those things which must be said in the subdued 
style have been interposed, we return effectively to those things which 
246 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XVIII, p. 145. 
247 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XX, p. 148. 
248 Ibid., p. 151. 
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must be said in the grand style, so that the impetus of our speech ebbs 
and flows like the sea."' Fit the manner of speaking with the subject 
matter. Know the subject matter beyond the words. Look behind them 
and find out how the original writer or speaker would have meant them 
to be spoken. There is a useful Platonic directive here. Find the thing 
(res) beyond the sign (signum). 
Augustine said that the martyred church father Cyprian 
appropriately used the subdued style himself when discussing the 
sacrament of the chalice. There he resolved the question as to whether 
or not the Lord's chalice would contain water alone or water mixed with 
wine.' And he used the moderate style when addressing virgins who 
because of greater glory deserved greater care. And Ambrose did the 
same when he said, "She was a virgin not only in body but also in mind. 
Her sincere disposition was not stained by any traces of deceit."' And 
Augustine himself used the grand style when he was dissuading the people 
of Caesarea in Mauritania from civil war--"for not only the citizens 
249 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XXII, p. 159. 
250 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. )0(1, p. 153. 
251 Ibid., p.  155. 
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themselves, but relatives, brothers, even parents and children, divided 
themselves into two parts for several successive days at a certain time of 
the year and solemnly fought each other with stones and each killed 
whomever he could--I pleaded in the grand style . 
Augustine summarized the use of Ciceronian principles by saying. 
"But is it true that all who are delighted are changed as in the grand style, 
all who are persuaded act, or in a subdued style all are taught know, or 
believe to be true, what they did not know before?"' Not every style will 
bring its designated results. But the master orator has a sense when a 
style should be used. And Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, has a sense 
when the truths of the classical methodology should be used and when 
they should be discarded. The principle of charity governed all things as 
it governed the manner in which the aspiring exegete read his Scriptures. 
One reason Augustine stood at an "Axial Period" in human history 
was because his educational philosophy helped free the western world 
from superstitions. For example, Augustine, as we pointed out previously, 
had no time for the belief that the stars hold the secret to one's future. 
252 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. XXIV, p. 160. 
253 Ibid., p. 161. 
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To desire to predict at birth, on the basis of such 
observations, the habits, actions, and fortunes of men 
is a great error and a great madness. For they observe 
the configurations of the stars which they call 
constellations at the time of birth of the one 
concerning whom these wretched men are consulted by 
those even more wretched."' 
His strongest point, however, against astrology's accurate predictions is 
when he cited the example of Jacob and Esau. Their life stories differ, yet 
they were born under the same configuration of the stars. 
And finally rhetoric itself, because it can be used to promote either 
justice or evil, should be used by the Christian. " . . . why should it not be 
obtained for the uses of the good in the service of truth if the evil usurp 
it for the winning of perverse and vain causes in defense of inquity and 
error?"' Reflecting still his distain for the vain-glory that the person 
gifted in rhetoric often sought, Augustine stated that the rules of rhetoric 
will not be taught in his school. "And I admonish them not to expect such 
rules from me, not that they have no utility, but because, if they have 
any, it should be sought elsewhere if perhaps some good man has the 
254 Ibid., Bk. II chap. )00[I, par. 33, p. 57. 
255 Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. II, par. 3, pp. 118-119. 
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opportunity to learn them."' 
So we have come full circle, so to speak, from Augustine who 
rejected his talk-shop at the time of his conversation to Augustine seeing 
something useful in the goals of rhetoric, namely "to teach, to delight, 
and to persuade". In de Doctrina Christiana it was apparent that some 
of the truths that Augustine thought were the Lord's were the truths of 
what made human speech effective. Augustine has learned that the 
mature Christian still has to live in the world of words. Here the catholic 
Christian was to use God's gift of speech wisely, but not arrogantly. 
256 Ibid. 
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Summary 
Augustine of Hippo, as a young man, was a man of his times. True 
to the spirit of the 4th century Roman culture that nurtured and 
schooled him, the brilliant young Augustine pursued the most popular 
academic discipline of the day: rhetoric. This popular discipline fit his 
gifts to teach an abstract truth, to turn a Latin phrase in an interesting 
way, and to convince others, even if it meant making a lie look like a 
truth. Finding in Cicero's Hortensius a kindred spirit, Augustine 
recognized in himself at the early age of nineteen his life's passion--the 
pursuit of Truth. Given the Roman culture's fascination with rhetoric, it 
is not surprising that Augustine's deep-seated passion for Truth resulted 
in a conflict with this Roman fascination. The personal tensions that 
Augustine found within himself had been going on in Graeco-Roman 
culture since the days of Plato and Isocrates. In the Roman culture 
Isocrates' school of rhetoric won out; but spiritually Plato's philosophical 
principles were used to grasp the unchangeable, eternal Truth of God. 
This Truth finally possessed Augustine's soul. 
The question for our purposes was--how much of the classical 
methodology of education, that reflected so much of what the 4th 
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century Roman society was, would Augustine retain and how much of it 
would he discard? Or how would Augustine work through the tension 
between his baptismal immersion into the Incarnated Word and the 
Roman culture in which he was also so thoroughly immersed? 
In de Ordine we found Augustine with his young followers and 
mother working through an answer to the questions concerning the 
presence of evil in God's good creation. The setting was Cassiciacum near 
Milan. The atmosphere was relaxed and perfect for a philosophical 
examination of this difficult theological question. The time was soon 
after his conversion in the late summer of 386 and before his baptism on 
Easter of 387. He has thoroughly and premediatatively given up his way 
of thinking as a rhetor and has thrown himself into the Platonic manner 
of thinking, in order to come up with a theological answer to the 
questions, does evil exist inside or outside of God's providence? Does God 
have a design that includes even the evil that is opposed to him? 
In a Socratic manner he led his chief student Licentius to the 
conclusion that God did have an order that laid behind and beneath the 
hard cruelties of Roman culture. This order of God was like the design of 
a painter who painted with both dark and light colors or like the poet 
136 
who used barbarisms as well as accepted poetic techniques to compose a 
poem. The dark colors and barbarisms may appear at first to be bad (like 
evil) but in the greater design of the painting and the poem they fit. 
Augustine's answer to the presence of evil, arrived at through the 
perceptions of the soul, was convincing and useful for any thinking 
Christian who was forced to live with the harshness of life. There was an 
order behind all things. It was the providence of the one, unchangeable, 
immovable God who became incarnate in human flesh. This salvific act 
itself was part of God's order. And this divine order can be best seen by 
those who have been trained in the classical methodology of education: 
in letters and grammar, in the Greek and Roman classics, in the 
wondering about things, and above all, in the ability to question the cause 
of all things. This was what Augustine was training his students to do at 
Cassiciacum. Through it they would have an answer to the presence of 
the harsh cruelties in life. 
Ten years later in de Doctrina Christiana Augustine was less 
philosophical and far more Scriptural. They were the Christian classics. 
Their truths were far more powerful than the truths found in the Roman 
and Greek classics. In this sense Augustine has distanced himself from his 
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Roman culture. 
Now the question was, in what way did the Christian student of 
Scriptures find the meaning of its truths and how did he communicate 
them? Augustine's central hermeneutical principle was simple. If the 
Scriptures didn't speak about charity (charitas) to one's God and to one's 
fellow man, including one's enemies, then one did not read Scriptures 
correctly. Augustine still retained his propensity to Plato's impractical 
methodology of finding Truth, needing to find reality (res) behind the 
words (signum). Therefore, although the Scriptures spoke of charity, the 
discovery of the meaning of individual passages should be a difficult and 
Platonic one. The deeper the meaning of a given passage the closer the 
exegete will come to the throne of the one, immovable, unchangeable 
God. In de Doctrina Christiana the Scriptures may have replaced in 
Augustine's mind the Greek and Roman classics, yet he still used the 
Socratic method of Plato to derive their meaning. 
Augustine retained another connection to Roman society when 
guiding the Scriptural exegete in practical manners of living. It was 
important for Augustine that the aspiring Scriptural exegete knew what 
truths in Roman society to participate in. The truths of astrology, based 
138 
on a secret meaning in the position of the stars at a given time 
(particularly at the time of a person's birth) were not to be trusted 
because the human interpretation of their meaning varied with the 
interpreter. Rather the Scriptural exegete should trust only the 
predictable movements of the stars, for where they will be in the future 
can be accurately predicted, and there was a common agreement on this 
among men. Augustine was helping the scriptural exegete to move away 
from participation in and reliance on the faulty notions of astrology. In 
the modern sense of the word, he was suggesting a far more scientific 
outlook on life for the Scriptural exegete and a far less superstitious 
outlook. 
Augustine made a similar suggestion with regard to customs and 
institutions in Roman society. Those that were agreed upon by men were 
true and can be trusted. Augustine moved away from the purely 
impractical philosophical manner of looking at life when he urged his 
Scriptural exegetes to pursue those things that were useful. The 
prediction of the movement of the stars was useful; but astrology was 
not. He viewed now the principles of rhetoric in a similar way. Now ten 
years after his baptism, Augustine softened his approach to rhetoric. The 
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Ciceronian principles of rhetoric can be put to use by the Christian orator 
as long as he did not learn them per se from Augustine's school and as 
long as he was unaware of them when he used them. It was clear, that in 
spite of his resignation from his talk-shop and of the principles of 
rhetoric, Augustine knew the importance of godly words delivered well. 
Such skills can be put to use in the Catholic Church. 
This brought us to Augustine's governing principle. Wherever the 
Scriptural exegete found truth, it was the Lord's. Augustine's perception 
of truth for the churchman was not limited to Scriptural truths, nor did 
the churchman participate and accept all society's truths. In retaining 
some of the classical methodology of education and rejecting other parts, 
Augustine has indeed reformed and renewed the classical methodology of 
education as he employed it for the services of the Catholic Church. 
The question that remained was, which truths can be trusted. The 
history of the church in Western Civilization answered this question: it 
increasingly leaned away from the superstitious truths and toward the 
scientific truths. Augustine, participating in an "Axial Point" of history, 
had already begun the process of pointing the person of faith in the 
Incarnate Word toward what we now know as scientific truth. 
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Some Present Day Applications 
Augustine wants his church leader to be a discerning person. He 
wants his church leader to have been trained in the best educational 
system of his day. His church leader doesn't get caught up in purely 
sensual perceptions but knows his soul and the God who created his soul. 
His church leader is gifted in words, in speaking, and in questioning the 
cause of things. He is a happy person. He knows the beats vita because 
he knows there is a divine design behind everything , including the evil 
things that happen in life. This divine design includes the coming of the 
one, immovable, unchangeable God in human flesh to save, heal, and 
rescue sense-driven mankind. 
There are some vocations that the person of faith can not 
participate in like the uses of rhetoric that leads to vain glory or like 
acting in a theatre that celebrates the immorality of the gods. Yet, 
Augustine wants his church leader to speak well and to know what 
manner of speaking is appropriate on any given occasion. Such virtues 
would be an asset to a church leader of any age. 
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